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Introduction
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."1 With these much-quoted words, Jus-
tice William Brennan, writing the opinion of the Supreme Court in the
1971 case of Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 set the stage for the debate over "pro-
creative liberty"3 : that complex of questions involved in defining the
"fundamental right"4 to decide "whether to bear or beget a child." The
Court's holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids legal distinctions between the rights of married and
single persons seeking access to contraception5 has since been used by
both courts and commentators to support a spectrum of procreative lib-
erties. These liberties range from court decisions granting broad parental
rights to the fathers of illegitimate children6 to suggestions by some
scholars that the "fundamental right" to decide "whether to bear or be-
1. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
2. 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
3. See, eg., sources cited infra note 7.
4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
5. The Court had struck down a prohibition on the use of contraceptive devices by mar-
ried couples six years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating an Illinois statute that
automatically deprived unwed fathers of guardianship of their dependent children upon the
death of the mother, whereas unwed mothers would be entitled to a hearing upon any state
challenge to their parental rights); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that the
natural father of an illegitimate child who had maintained a close relationship with the child
had right equal to the mother's to block a proposed adoption). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding a New York statute providing all mothers but only certain classes
of "putative fathers" with an adoption veto power). The Court distinguished Caban from Lehr
on the grounds that Lehr had never supported the child or entered his name in the state's
"putative father registry," which would have entitled him to notice of the adoption proceeding.
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get a child" must necessarily include access to the latest reproductive
technologies. 7 Some commentators assert that the equal protection prin-
ciples enunciated in Eisenstadt and other cases dictate that any legislative
attempt to restrict such access according to marital status would be con-
stitutionally impermissible.8
In August 1988 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (the Act), which the House of Delegates of the Ameri-
can Bar Association subsequently adopted at its meeting in February
1989. 9 The purpose of the Act is to define the legal status of children
conceived through the use of extraordinary procedures and arrange-
7. The most vocal proponent of this view has been Professor John A. Robertson. See
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Repro-
duction, 59 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 939 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405
(1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]; Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the
State's Burden of Proof in Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 18 (1988); accord, Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7 (1988); see also Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46:3 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 2S (1986) [hereinafter Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations] ("[Tihere is
good reason to expect the courts to recognize a constitutional right to procreate by noncoital
and donor-assisted means."). Most commentators, however, think that access to surrogacy
would not be upheld as a constitutionally protected right, particularly when payment of a fee
to the surrogate is involved. M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 68 (1988); Annas, The
Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. & MED.
213, 222 (1987) ("[A]lthough a general ban on the use of surrogacy might be successfully
challenged (as interfering with a couple's constitutional right to procreate without a compel-
ling state interest), a ban on commercial surrogacy ... would likely survive constitutional
challenge."); Capron & Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm for
Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 34 (1988); Holder, Surrogate Mother-
hood and the Best Interests of Children, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 51, 53 (1988) ("It
seems that the right to procreate is limited to the right to make private choices, and does not
include the right to make contracts about reproduction and to ask the legal system to recog-
nize or enforce them.").
8. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 7, at 432-36; Robertson, Embryos, supra
note 7, at 962-64; Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried,
98 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1985); see also Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artifi-
cial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1981) (arguing that access to artificial insemination by single women could not constitution-
ally be forbidden).
9. Robinson & Kurtz, Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act: A View
from the Drafting Committee, 13 NOVA L. REv. 491 (1989). Robert C. Robinson was Chair-
man of the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Act; Paul M. Kurtz was its Reporter. Their
article is largely replicated in the Prefatory Note to the statute. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN
OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 102-17 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter UNIF. CONCEP-
TION ACT] (reprinted in the Appendix of this Article).
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ments,' ° specifically, artificial insemination by donor (AID),11 in vitro
fertilization (IVF), 12 and surrogate motherhood agreements.13 With re-
spect to surrogacy in particular, the Act remains neutral on the question
of its appropriateness as a means of helping infertile couples to achieve
parenthood, but it does propose two alternative provisions, depending
upon whether a state wishes to recognize surrogacy contracts as a legal
means of procreation. One alternative makes all such agreements unen-
forceable.1" The other sanctions a court-supervised agreement that be-
comes specifically enforceable 180 days after the surrogate's last artificial
insemination with the intended father's sperm, provided she has not exer-
cised her right to recant prior to that date. 5
Under the provisions of the Act, the "intended parents" in a surro-
gacy arrangement must be "a man and woman, married to each other."' 6
This requirement arguably runs into two obstacles stemming from Jus-
tice Brennan's declaration in Eisenstadt v. Baird.7 The first is the con-
tention that any legal means of procreation is part of the "right of
privacy" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
10. The development and increasing use of noncoital reproductive techniques is by now
well chronicled. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-
BA-358, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, (1988) [hereinafter OTA, INFER-
TILITY]. In 1988, the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that two to three million
American couples wanted to have a baby but required medical help to do so. Id. at 3. The
OTA estimated that as of 1982, 2.4 million married couples (approximately 8.5% of those with
wives aged 15 to 44) and an unknown number of unmarried couples were affected by infertil-
ity. Id. Although available information indicated no increase in the rate of infertility except in
the group of married couples with wives age 20 to 24, there had been a dramatic increase in the
number of visits to physicians' offices for infertility services in recent years (600,000 in 1968,
compared to about 1.6 million in 1984, with a particularly sharp increase after 1980). Id. at 4-
5. For an overview of the medical possibilities and social and legal issues arising from them,
see Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465
(1983). See also Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations, supra note 7.
11. For an overview of the use of artificial insemination in the United States, see generally
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BP-BA-48, ARTIFICIAL IN-
SEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY-BACK-
GROUND PAPER (1988). The OTA survey estimated that "172,000 women underwent artificial
insemination in 1986-87, at an average cost of $953, resulting in 35,000 births from artificial
insemination by husband (AIH), and 30,000 births from artificial insemination by donor
(AID)." Id. at 3. With respect to the legal and social issues involved, see Shaman, Legal
Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1980).
12. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 7, contains a thorough discussion of the social and
legal issues surrounding IVF. See also OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 250-55.
13. For excellent recent discussions of the problems and social issues presented by surro-
gacy, see M. FIELD, supra note 7; Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy, 16 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE (1988) (a compendium of articles, some of which are cited supra note 7).
14. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 5, Alternative B.
15. Id. §§ 5-9, Alternative A.
16. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 1.
17. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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ment, and thus may only be regulated by narrowly tailored rules
designed to serve compelling state interests. 8 The language of Eisenstadt
suggests that the state has no compelling interest in limiting procreative
fights to married couples.19 In the views of a number of commentators,
the result can be no different simply because procreation is achieved
through surrogacy rather than in some other way.20
The second obstacle is an equal protection argument that the state
cannot legitimately distinguish between married and unmarried persons
in defining those to whom this new means of procreation will be avail-
able.21 This argument is sharpened by an examination of public policies
with respect to other state-sanctioned means of becoming a parent. All
states permit adoption by single persons.22 Furthermore, while a major-
ity of states have statutes regulating AID, none of them prohibits access
to this technology on the part of single women, and a few explicitly con-
template such a possibility.23 The result is that a single woman who
wishes to bear and raise a child genetically related to her may do so; but
under the proposed Act, even with the advent of legalized surrogacy, a
single man would not be able to beget and raise a child genetically related
to him. This fact raises a potential issue of gender discrimination. The
distinction that the Act would draw between married and unmarried but
cohabiting couples is also questionable.
This Article argues that the proposed Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act is not constitutionally infirm. Rather, the
model legislation takes a cautious approach to a relatively recent and still
extremely controversial means of achieving parenthood-a means that
may or may not turn out to have beneficial social consequences. Under
these circumstances, state legislatures that approve limited use of surro-
gacy agreements would be acting entirely reasonably in adopting the rela-
tively strict regulatory scheme contemplated by the Act. The restricted
access to married couples actually presents a paradigm for examining the
validity of general legislative circumspection when legalized surrogacy is
concerned. This focus is useful because the married-parent requirement
seems likely to be challenged and because the requirement seems particu-
larly vulnerable to constitutional attack.
This Article concludes that legislatures are entitled to limit access to
legalized surrogacy agreements according to their perceptions of the best
18. Id. at 453-54.
19. Id. at 452-53.
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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interests of the children resulting from those agreements. The state's de-
termination constitutes a governmental interest sufficiently compelling to
overcome any counterarguments from unmarried persons desiring access
to the technology. Should surrogacy turn out to be a highly satisfactory
social solution to the problems of persons desiring parentage but unable
to achieve it on their own, legislatures might then decide to re-examine
their earlier positions and make access to enforceable surrogacy agree-
ments available to unmarried as well as married persons. Until such
time, however, a state legislature's choice is not limited by existing prin-
ciples of constitutional law.
I. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
A. Purpose and Scope
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 24 now
stands ready for consideration by state legislatures.25 The Drafting Com-
24. For a copy of the Act, see Appendix, infra.
25. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was organized in
1892 "to promote uniformity in state law on all subjects where uniformity is desirable and
practicable... by voluntary action of each state government." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1988-89 REFERENCE BOOK 2 (1988). The Con-
ference consists of Commissioners from each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Its Standing Committee on Scope and Program receives proposals for subject matter of Uni-
form Acts and makes recommendations to the Executive Committee. Once the Conference
accepts a subject, a special committee is appointed from among the Commissioners to draft a
proposed Act. Drafts must be discussed, section by section, by the full Conference at no fewer
than two annual meetings before the Conference can take a vote of states to recommend the
draft as a Uniform Act to their respective legislatures. Id. at 2-4.
To date, the Conference has drafted over two hundred uniform laws, which have met with
varying degrees of state acceptance. Id. at 3. Most notable, of course, has been the Uniform
Commercial Code, but other Uniform Acts have been widely accepted as well. For example,
the Uniform Parentage Act, which constitutes the basic legal framework for the operation of
the Act under consideration here, is currently in force, with some modifications, in 18 states.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973) (Table of Jurisdictions, Supp. 1991). The
Conference appointed the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act "to draft an act, a child oriented act, to provide order and design that would
inure to the benefit of those children who have been born as a result of... medical miracles."
Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 492. The Committee completed its work in August 1988,
when the full Conference adopted the proposed Act appended to this Article.
An important point to note in assessing any Uniform Act is the degree of care and exper-
tise that have been brought to bear on the proposed statute's formation. Also important to
consider is the extent of analysis and debate to which the proposed statute has been subjected
during its journey through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and, as here, the ABA House of Delegates. The Drafting Committee's work has included
much information gathering, as well as extensive deliberations over constitutional require-
ments, actual societal practices, and desirable social policy. In the words of the chairperson
and the reporter of this Uniform Act, "Some provisions may appear arbitrary and seemingly
inequitable at first, but not one word in this Act was casually drafted." Id. at 493. One thus
mittee's original charge was "to effect the security and well-being of chil-
dren born and living in our midst as a result of assisted conception,"26
including the "use of such limited and monitored surrogacy procedures
as might be necessary to accomplish" the Committee's general man-
date.2 7 Consonant with its limited purpose, the Act is quite narrow in
scope. It does not purport to be a thorough regulation of those practices
(AID, IVF, and surrogacy) underlying its operation; rather, its primary
aim is to clarify the legal status of children resulting from such "assisted
conception. ' 28  The Act's narrowness and brevity represent deliberate
choices made to serve the best interests of children and thereby also to
strengthen the Act's appeal to state legislators.29 Its primary protection
lies in the stipulation that a child whose parentage is determined pursu-
ant to the Act's provisions is the child only of his or her parents as deter-
mined thereunder.30 Absent superseding subsequent events changing the
can expect this draft to receive serious consideration from state legislatures attempting to deal
with the often confusing quandaries posed by increasing contemporary use of new reproduc-
tive procedures and arrangements.
North Dakota has already adopted the Act, with minor variations, although the legisla-
ture chose the Act's alternative provisions voiding surrogacy contracts. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1989). A bill incorporating a number of provisions similar to those of
the Act, including legalized surrogacy, was introduced into the Virginia legislature in 1990.
Va. Senate Bill No. 14 (Jan. 10, 1990). The bill was set over to the next session and eventually
defeated. The legislature did adopt an almost identical enactment that recognizes court-super-
vised surrogacy but forbids compensation beyond reasonable medical expenses and ancillary
costs. The act will take effect July 1, 1993. 1991 Va. Acts Ch. 600 (Mar. 25, 1991); see also
Report of the Joint Subcommittee on Surrogate Motherhood, Senate Document No. 10, at 20
(1991) ("The title of the Act, 'Status of Children of Assisted Conception,' was chosen to indi-
cate some consistency with the proposal of the same name as drafted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. However, the Virginia proposal differs
substantially from the proposed Uniform Act.") Unlike the Uniform Act, the Virginia law
makes provision for validating surrogacy agreements that have not received prior court
approval.
26. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 492.
27. Id.
28. "Assisted conception" is defined by this statute as "a pregnancy resulting from (i)
fertilizing an egg of a woman with sperm of a man by means other than sexual intercourse or
(ii) implanting an embryo, but the term does not include the pregnancy of a wife resulting from
fertilizing her egg with sperm of her husband." UNIF. CONCEPTION AcT, supra note 9, § 1(1).
In other words, "assisted conception" includes artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization
(when the respective providers of the sperm and egg are not husband and wife), and fertiliza-
tion through sexual intercourse when the resulting embryo is transplanted into another wo-
man's womb. In no event, however, does "assisted conception," as defined by this Act, include
husband-wife procreation, even when that process is aided by technology; that situation is
governed by otherwise relevant state law, such as the Uniform Parentage Act. UNIF. CONCEP-
TION AcT, supra note 9, § I, comment.
29. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 492.
30. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 10(a).
Svrine, 19911 RESTRICTING SURROGACY
494 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:487
child's legal status,"1 the parent-child relationships defined by the Act
control for purposes of applying intestate succession and probate laws,
and for determining the child's eligibility to participate in donative trans-
fers defined by class relationships.3 2
B. Surrogacy Provisions of the Act
The Act sets forth two alternative provisions, designated Alterna-
tives A and B, regarding contracts pursuant to which a woman agrees to
become a surrogate and relinquishes her rights and duties as parent of
any child conceived through assisted conception. Alternative B summa-
rily proclaims all such agreements void.33 Alternative A34 consists of
sections 5 through 9 of the Act. This alternative recognizes surrogacy as
a legitimate means of achieving parenthood in certain carefully deline-
ated circumstances. The portion of the proposed statute addressing sur-
rogacy is more specifically regulatory than its other sections. This
characteristic reflects most acutely the Drafting Committee's impetus to
31. For example, other than in situations governed by surrogacy agreements, the Act pro-
vides that the husband of a woman who gives birth as the result of an assisted conception is the
child's legal father, unless he commences an action within two years of learning of the child's
birth. In such an action, the husband must also prove to the court's satisfaction that he did not
consent to the assisted conception. The mother and child must be parties to the action. Id.
§ 3; see also id. § 3, comment (pointing out that this section's presumptive paternity "reflects a
concern for the best interests of the children" and that the obligation is never on the child or
the mother to prove the husband's paternity.) Moreover, the presumption can be rebutted
only by the husband, not by someone acting on his behalf, such as a guardian, administrator,
or executor. Id. The provision applies even if the marriage is later annulled or declared inva-
lid. Id. § 3.
32. Id. § 10(b) & comment. The comment points out that this section parallels similar
provisions in adoption statutes.
33. Id. § 5, Alternative B. This section further provides that a woman who has agreed to
become a surrogate is the mother of a resulting child, and her husband, if a party to the
agreement, is the father. If the woman's husband was not a party to the original agreement, or
if she is unmarried, paternity is determined by otherwise relevant state law. The Drafting
Committee thought it was important for states rejecting surrogacy to enact these provisions
because various individuals are likely to attempt such arrangements, regardless of legal re-
straints, and the resulting children need a specified means for determining their status. Id. § 5,
Alternative B & comment. North Dakota has enacted this provision. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1989). Note that in the unfortunate circumstance in those situations
when paternity is governed by existing state law, a custody battle could still develop between
the mother and the biological father. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988) and the trial court order on remand, 225 N.J. Super. 267, 542 A.2d 52 (1988) (when a
natural father and his wife sued to enforce a surrogacy contract with the natural mother, the
court held that surrogacy contracts were unenforceable because they conflicted with the state's
adoption laws and were contrary to public policy. The best interests of the child justified a
custody award to the natural father and his wife; however, the natural mother was entitled to
visitation rights).
34. Alternative A will be the subject matter of all future references in this Article, unless
otherwise specified.
protect the "rights, security and well-being" of affected children and the
concomitant "great urgency . . . to provide a child with two legal
parents.1
3 5
The scheme for legalized surrogacy attempts to protect the rights of
all parties and to maximize the chances for a successful outcome through
means of close court supervision over all surrogacy agreements and a
requirement for psychological counseling of the intended parents, of the
surrogate, and of the surrogate's husband, if she is married.
To be specifically enforceable, a surrogacy agreement must include
"intended parents," defined as "a man and woman, married to each
other, who enter into an agreement under this [Act] providing that they
will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate through assisted concep-
tion using egg or sperm of one or both of the intended parents."31 6 The
"surrogate" is "an adult woman who enters into an agreement to bear a
child conceived through assisted conception for intended parents.
37
Thus, not only must the intended parents be a married couple, but at
least one of them must supply genetic material for the resulting child.
Another primary restriction on the use of surrogacy as a technique
for procreation lies in the requirement for a judicial finding that "the
intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so without
unreasonable risk to an unborn child or to the physical or mental health
of the intended mother or child, and the finding is supported by medical
"138evidence ....
When these circumstances exist, the intended parents, the surrogate,
and the surrogate's husband, who must be included if she is married,
may enter into a written surrogacy agreement. 39 The agreement must
receive court approval prior to any conception. The prescribed judicial
procedure includes a number of safeguards designed to avoid the pitfalls
inherent in surrogacy arrangements: appointment of a guardian ad litem
to represent the interests of the future child;' provision for mandatory or
discretionary appointment of counsel to represent the surrogate;41 and a
closed hearing in which the court must make a series of specific findings
aimed toward protection of the interests of the various parties to the
35. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 493. These authors note that "[i]n drafting Alter-
native A, the Committee made clear, positive choices in each instance to produce a child-
oriented act." Id. at 494.
36. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 1(3).
37. Id. § 1(4).
38. Id. § 6(b)(2).
39. Id. § 5(a).
40. Id. § 6(a).
41. Id. § 6(a).
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agreement, and most particularly, aimed toward protection of the best
interests of the child.42 In addition to functional infertility on the in-
tended mother's part,43 the court must find that (1) the surrogate has had
at least one pregnancy and delivery;' (2) the surrogate can bear another
child without unreasonable risk to herself or the child;45 (3) a home
study has been conducted of the intended parents and of the surrogate,
and both the intended parents and the surrogate, as well as her husband,
if any, meet the state's standards of fitness applicable to adoptive par-
ents; 46 (4) all parties have received counseling concerning the effect of
surrogacy, and the court has a record of conclusions about their capacity
to enter into and fulfill the agreement;47 and (5) the parties have volunta-
rily entered into the agreement and understand its meaning and effect. 48
In addition, any reports of medical, psychological, or genetic screening
required by other state laws or agreed to by the parties must be made
available to all parties.49 There also must be adequate provision for all
reasonable health-care costs associated with the pregnancy and birth.50
Finally, the court must conclude that the agreement will not be "substan-
tially detrimental to the interest of any of the affected individuals."5"
The court's initial order approving the surrogacy agreement governs any
conception occurring within twelve months from its original date.52
Prior to a conception, the agreement may be terminated by the
court, for cause, or by any of the parties, upon giving written notice to
the others.5 3 In addition, a surrogate who has provided the egg for an
assisted conception (the usual case) may recant her decision and termi-
nate the agreement, without liability to the intended parents, by filing
written notice to the court within 180 days after the last insemination
under the agreement.5 4 Thus, the surrogate is permitted to change her
42. Id. § 6, comment.
43. Id. § 6(b)(2).
44. Id. § 6(b)(6).
45. Id. § 6(b)(6).
46. Id. § 6(b)(4).
47. Id. § 6(b)(7).
48. Id. § 6(b)(5).
49. Id. § 6(b)(8).
50. Id. § 6(b)(9). This requirement extends to responsibility for such costs if the agree-
ment is terminated for any reason, pursuant to the provisions of § 7.
51. Id. § 6(b)(10). Additionally, absent agreement to the contrary, the intended parents
bear all court costs, attorney's fees, and expenses associated with the hearing. Id.
§ 6(b)(10)(c). The Act also specifically authorizes payment to a surrogate. Id. § 9(a). The
court maintains continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the matter until a resulting child is 180
days old. Id. § 6(b)(10)(e).
52. Id. § 6(b).
53. Id. § 7(a).
54. Id. § 7(b).
mind for roughly the same period of time that she would be entitled to
decide to abort, a choice which constitutionally could not be taken from
her by agreement."5 The surrogate's autonomy rights also are protected
by the Act's provision that the agreement may not limit her ability to
make decisions concerning her own health care or that of the developing
fetus.
5 6
Assuming that the surrogate neither aborts nor recants, the agree-
ment becomes specifically enforceable, and the child born is the child of
the intended parents.5 If the surrogate exercises her recantation right,
she is the mother of the resulting child, and her husband, if he was a
party to the agreement, is the child's legal father.58 If the surrogate was
unmarried at the time she entered the agreement, or if a married surro-
gate's husband was not a party to it, the child's paternity is governed by
state law5 9 -a situation that might result in the kind of custody dispute
present in In re Baby M. 60
As a final precaution, Alternative A provides a procedure for any of
the parties to bring an action within 180 days after the child's birth to
rebut the Act's presumption that a child born to a surrogate within 300
days after assisted conception has resulted from that assisted concep-
tion.61 Should the action be successful, the child's parentage will be gov-
erned by otherwise relevant state law.62
55. The courts have not settled whether a woman's contractual waiver of her abortion
right would be recognized by the courts (either as specifically enforceable or as grounds for
recovery of damages). Most commentators, however, agree that the abortion decision is re-
served to the woman alone and could not be waived, based on the holdings of Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny, particularly Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 69 (1976) (invalidating a requirement for spousal consent to the woman's abortion, partly
on the grounds that the state cannot " 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself
is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising ... .'" (quoting the lower court opinion,
392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (1975))). See, e.g., M. FIELD, supra note 7, at 64-66; Annas, supra
note 7, at 227-28; Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1936 (1986); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the
Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REv. 71 (1982) (basing her argument on
the doctrine that "a court will not order specific performance of a personal service contract,
especially when court supervision would be required," id. at 85-86).
56. UNIF. CONCEPrION ACT, supra note 9, § 9(b).
57. Id. § 8(a)(1). Upon receiving written notice of the birth from the intended parents,
the court causes a new birth certificate to be issued reflecting their status and has the original
placed under seal. Id. § 8(b).
58. Id. § 8(a)(2).
59. Id. § 8(a)(2).
60. Id. § 8, comment; In re Baby M, 109 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1227 (1988). With
respect to a similar dilemma under the second alternative, Alternative B, see supra note 33.
61. Id. § 9(d).
62. Id. § 9, comment.
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II. The Uniform Act and the Marriage Requirement: A
Constitutional Problem?
Surrogacy has been a subject of both increasing use63 and increasing
controversy," creating legal uncertainties that more and more states per-
ceive as intolerable.6"
Given its origins in the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and its adoption by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association, Alternative A of the Uniform Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act appears to formulate a legalized surrogacy policy
that state legislatures are quite likely to consider.6 6 Furthermore, any
63. The OTA estimates that by the beginning of 1988 nearly 600 babies had been born
through surrogate arrangements. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 267. Time recently
estimated that there have been over 2,000 births under surrogacy agreements over the past
three years. And Baby Makes Four, TIME, Aug. 27, 1990, at 53.
64. Surrogacy has been the subject of numerous articles and debates in both scholarly and
popular press publications, particularly since the publicity attendant on In re Baby M. See,
eg., M. FIELD, supra note 7; E. KANE, BIRTH MOTHER: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST
LEGAL SURROGATE MOTHER (1988); T. SHANNON, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETH-
ICS OF USING HuMAN BEINGS (1988); Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy, supra note
13. For recent general commentaries on new reproductive technologies and arrangements,
including surrogacy, see REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S (S. Cohen & N. Taub 1989);
C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER (1989); L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS (1984); Symposium on
Reproductive Rights, 13 NOVA L. REv. 319 (1989); Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues
Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986).
65. In recent years, state legislatures have introduced numerous bills to prohibit or regu-
late surrogacy agreements. In 1988, 59 bills or resolutions pertaining to surrogacy were intro-
duced in 27 states. Twenty-seven of these would prohibit or sharply curtail surrogacy;
eighteen would permit it; and fourteen would create a study committee. Eleven states passed
bills during that year (four prohibiting all surrogacy; one prohibiting commercial surrogacy;
and six establishing study committees). NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION
FACTBOOK 120; see also 'Baby M' Decision Creates Flurry of Legislative Activity, 13 FAM. L.
REP. 1295 (1987); Surrogate Parenthood: A Legislative Update, 13 FAM. L. REP. 1442 (1987)
(containing a chart summarizing 62 bills in 26 jurisdictions, all introduced between January
and June 1987; a federal bill had also been proposed); Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regard-
ing Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. 3001 (1985). See generally Charo, Legislative
Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 96 (1988).
66. As of this writing, 12 states have passed legislation addressing surrogacy: Arizona,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (prohibits all surrogacy parentage contracts); Arkan-
sas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1989) (contemplates surrogacy and provides for a court-
ordered substituted birth certificate); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (1)(i) (West Supp.
1990) (voids commercial surrogacy contracts but permits "preplanned adoption" agreements,
provided that the volunteer mother may rescind within seven days following birth; the in-
tended parents may pay reasonable medical and legal expenses; the adoption must be finally
approved by a court under the Florida Adoption Act); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1,
31-8-2 (Burns Supp. 1990) (surrogate agreements are void as against public policy); Kentucky,
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie Supp. 1990) (voids commercial surrogacy contracts);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp. 1990) (commercial surrogacy con-
tracts are null and void as contrary to public policy); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.851-.861 (West Supp. 1988) (surrogacy contracts are null and void as against public
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state legislature contemplating legalized surrogacy, whether or not it
chooses to follow the format proposed by the Uniform Act, may well
wish to restrict access to surrogacy arrangements to married couples as
intended parents of the resulting child. Yet some single persons have
already sought to use surrogacy as a means of attaining parenthood,67
and others are sure to follow, particularly if the practice of surrogacy is
removed from its legal limbo and given official state recognition and
sanction. Single persons wishing to assert constitutional challenges
against a legislative restriction limiting parenthood through surrogacy to
married couples have two available arguments: (1) that such a restriction
violates their fundamental right of privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment6" because it infringes on their
right to decide whether to bear or beget a child; and (2) that this legisla-
tive classification based on marital status is invidious discrimination
which violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.69
policy; participation is a misdemeanor and brokerage is a felony); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-21,200 (Supp. 1988) (commercial surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable; the
biological father has all the rights and obligations to the child imposed by law); Nevada, NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (Michie Supp. 1990) (prohibition against payment for private
adoption does not apply "if a woman enters into a lawful contract to act as a surrogate");
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1989) (substantially adopts the
Uniform Act, including Alternative B, declaring all surrogacy agreements void); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989) (all surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable as contrary
to public policy; brokerage is a misdemeanor; the act is prospectively repealed as of July 1,
1991, and prior to January 1, 1991, the Legislative Interim Social Services Committee is to
analyze relevant issues and make recommendations to the legislature); 1991 Va. Acts Ch. 600
(Mar. 25, 1991; effective date, July 1, 1993) (to be codified in amendments to VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 32.1-261, 32.1-289.1, and 63.1-236.1 and will add to VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20.156-20.165)
(permits court-supervised surrogacy and contemplates specific enforceability after 180 days
from the last insemination with the intended father's sperm, but permits no compensation to
the surrogate beyond reasonable medical and ancillary costs; also has a procedure for validat-
ing surrogacy arrangements that have not received prior court approval, when the surrogate
agrees to relinquish her parental rights after birth).
67. In its 1987 survey of surrogate mother matching services, the Office of Technology
Assessment found nine reports of single men accepted by agencies as prospective clients and
one instance of a lesbian couple (presumably, one of these women would have to be the adopt-
ing parent). OTA, INFERTILrrY, supra note 10, at 269. Noel Keane, one of the first brokers of
surrogacy contracts in the country, reports examples of both single men and single women
seeking surrogacy services. N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 289-90 (1981).
68. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides, inter alia, that "[n]o Staie shall.., deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...."
69. "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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A. The Due Process Argument: Procreative Liberty
Justice Brennan's famous words from Eisenstadt v. Baird7 ° define
the constitutionally protected "right of privacy" to include the right "to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."71  Some courts72 and many commentators73 translate this lan-
guage into a broad complex of procreative liberties, which cannot be in-
fringed upon, or even regulated to any burdensome extent, without
violating the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment. According to this view, the "fun-
damental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child" can be govern-
mentally regulated only by a narrowly tailored means employed in the
service of a compelling state interest.74
Taken to its logical extreme, the notion that procreative liberty en-
compasses all possible aspects of the decision "whether to bear or beget a
child" means that the government cannot bar access to new reproductive
technologies and arrangements unless it can demonstrate some compel-
ling interest in doing so. For example, the practice of surrogacy could
constitutionally be prohibited by the government only if such a bar were
necessary to prevent exploitation of the women who would serve as sur-
rogates,75 or if these arrangements were viewed as violations of "baby
70. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
71. Id. at 453 (1971).
72. For example, the trial court in In re Baby M specifically held that the right to
noncoital procreation is protected by the Constitution and that this protection extends to the
use of a surrogate. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 386, 525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (1987). Of course, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed this holding. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 448, 537 A.2d 1227,
1253 (1988). The court in Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex reL Arm-
strong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky. 1986), cited the protection of constitutional liberty interests
as the only role for courts in determining the validity of surrogacy contracts. The court went
on to hold that a surrogacy arrangement did not violate Kentucky's statutory prohibition
against payment for adoption. But see Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438
(1981) (acknowledging a fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child, but
holding that the couple's right was not infringed by the state's prohibition of a commercial
surrogacy arrangement). The court in Doe v. Kelley held such arrangements violated Michi-
gan's statutes against payment for adoption.
73. See supra note 7.
74. Courts traditionally employ this criterion in cases concerning fundamental rights gen-
erally and rights deemed to be included in the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause in particular. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTTIONAL LAw 769-1435,
esp. 769-80 (2d ed. 1988).
75. The exploitation of women, particularly poor women, is, in the eyes of many, a chief
argument militating against the legalization of surrogacy. See, e.g., Annas, Fairy Tales Surro-
gate Mothers Tell, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27 (1988) ("[Ihe core reality of surrogate
motherhood is that it is both classist and sexist: a method to obtain children genetically re-
lated to white males by exploiting poor women." Id at 27). While some feminists agree,
selling" laws.76 Women who serve as surrogates, however, arguably can
be protected from exploitation by a more narrowly tailored means than
outright prohibition.77 Also, in the views of many, the "baby selling"
argument is overcome by characterizing the agreement as a contract for
services, not for a product.7" Indeed, prohibition of surrogacy arrange-
ments could be defined as an infringement on both the would-be surro-
gate's procreative liberty79 and the rights of the person or couple who
wish to employ her services.
Analysts who hold such an expansive view of procreative liberty
may also insist that government cannot properly regulate the conditions
under which persons desiring parenthood choose to employ new technol-
ogies or arrangements.8 0 Thus, a legislature's limitation of the use of
surrogacy to situations in which intended parents are functionally infer-
tile"1 would be just as constitutionally impermissible as a restriction lim-
iting a woman's abortion choice to situations in which pregnancy and
delivery would pose an unreasonable risk to her life or health. If this
kind of broad procreative liberty is included as an aspect of the constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy, a would-be parent or would-be par-
others see this viewpoint as a paternalistic denial of women's rights to make their own choices.
See Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 72 (1988); Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, 16 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 81 (1988).
76. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized surrogacy as "the sale of a child, or, at
the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537
A.2d. 1227, 1248 (1988). The court found that the payment of money in this context was
illegal and perhaps criminal under New Jersey's statute prohibiting the use of money in con-
nection with adoptions. Id. at 1240-42. All states have similar laws. Gostin, supra note 7.
The "baby selling" argument, based on such laws, has been used to invalidate fees and ex-
penses over and above reasonable medical and legal costs. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa.
449, 517 A.2d 925 (1986) (violation of state constitution). The "commodification" of babies is
a primary fear of many opponents of commercial surrogacy. Capron & Radin, supra note 7;
Holder, supra note 7; Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987); Katz,
Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 1 (1986).
77. Requirements that the surrogate be separately represented, that she must have had
one pregnancy and delivery, and that she receive psychological counseling are examples of
protections contemplated by the Act. See UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, at § 6.
78. Gostin, supra note 7, at 10-12; Robertson, Embryos, supra note 7, at 1021-23. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that payments to a woman under a surrogacy contract
were for her services, and not for the baby. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Common-
wealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213-14 (Ky. 1986).
79. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 7, at 409. Elsewhere, however, Professor
Robertson suggests that the "partial reproductive roles" played by donors and surrogates
"may have less of the meaning that gives reproduction its significance, and therefore need not
be as fully protected." Robertson, Embryos, supra note 7, at 956.
80. See, eg., Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 7.
81. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act contemplates precisely
this type of legislative limitation. UNIF. CONCEPTION AT, supra note 9, § 6(b)(2).
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ents could choose to use artificially assisted conception, including
surrogacy, simply because pregnancy appears uncomfortable or inconve-
nient, or because it might be unattractive or interrupt a promising
career.
82
1. From Negative to Positive: A Necessary Connection?
The argument for an expansive definition of procreative liberty
based upon the Due Process Clause is flawed in several significant re-
spects. First, it ignores, or minimizes, the significant fact that Supreme
Court cases decided under the rubric of "matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child" 3 con-
cern protection of the right not to procreate, rather than of any rights to
conceive, bear, or nurture children. Eisenstadt v. Baird, like Griswold v.
Connecticut,84 concerned the right of access to contraceptive devices.
Roe v. Wade, which held that the "right of privacy.., is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy,"" and the Roe progeny all concern aspects and implications of
the abortion decision right.8" Indeed, Professor John A. Robertson,
probably the foremost proponent of a broad definition of procreative lib-
erty,87 acknowledges the "negative" nature of the constitutional protec-
tions that the Court has defined, 8 and concedes that "[fjreedom to have
sex without reproduction does not guarantee freedom to have reproduc-
82. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 7.
The right of married persons to use noncoital and collaborative means of conception
to overcome infertility must extend to any purpose, including selecting the gender or
genetic characteristics of the child or transferring the burden of gestation to another.
Restricting the right of noncoital or collaborative reproduction to one purpose, such
as relief of infertility, contradicts the meaning of a right of autonomy in procreation
and also raises insuperable problems of definition and monitoring.
Id at 430.
83. Note that as first used by Justice Brennan, this phrase was uttered in dictum. Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The case actually held that "whatever the rights of
the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmar-
ried and the married alike." Id. The Court specifically declined to base its ruling on due
process analysis "because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection stan-
dard." Id. at 447 n.7.
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
86. E.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
87. See supra note 7 and articles cited therein.
88. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 7, at 955; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note
7, at 405 n.3.
tion without sex." 9
This does not mean that recognition of positive aspects to procrea-
tive liberty is altogether lacking in Supreme Court jurisprudence. As
long ago as 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court spoke of procrea-
tion as "one of the basic civil rights of man."9 Like Justice Brennan's
language in Eisenstadt, however, this was dictum.91 The Skinner court
also based its decision upon equal protection grounds, rather than a due
process analysis. 92 Furthermore, the right referred to in Skinner was the
capacity to procreate, not any particular procreative activity. The Court
went on to state that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the [human] race." 93
Nonetheless, it certainly is true that Supreme Court cases have
"long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 94 In Justice Powell's words, "A host of
cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska... and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters... have consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.' "91 This realm includes personal deci-
sions "relating to marriage; procreation; contraception; family relation-
ships; and child rearing and education."96 In one abortion rights case,
Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he decision whether or not to bear or be-
get a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices. That decision holds a particularly important place in the history
of the right of privacy, a right first explicitly recognized in... Griswold v.
Connecticut .... 97
Again, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,9s the Supreme
Court held that the requirements of two school boards for extensive ma-
ternity leave constituted impermissibly heavy burdens on protected free-
doms of choice in matters affecting marriage and family life, thus
89. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 7, at 406.
90. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
91. See supra note 83.
92. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that the state could not impose
automatically forced sterilization for certain criminal activity when other felonies, otherwise
carrying the same punishment, were excepted from the operative statute. 316 U.S. at 541-42.
93. Id. at 541; cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (defining "liberty" to
include, inter alia, the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children").
94. Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
95. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925);
see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
96. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citations omitted).
97. Id.
98. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. La-
Fleur is in line with the Court's general acknowledgment that "individu-
als draw much of their emotional enrichment from" relationships such as
"those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage;
childbirth; the raising and education of children; and cohabitation with
one's relatives"; thus, "[p]rotecting these relationships from unwarranted
state interference... safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty." 99
Despite the Court's declarations concerning the nature and impor-
tance of rights protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process
Clause, however, the Court has never recognized a right of coital repro-
duction outside the marriage relationship."°° The right of any woman,
married or single, to bring an existing pregnancy to term,101 as well as
the rights of unwed parents to rear their children," 2 do not negate this
conclusion. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the Court would ex-
tend its definitions of privacy rights to include any particular form of
noncoital reproduction, for either married or single people.
The definition of procreative liberty that can be gleaned from the
Supreme Court's cases to date thus includes a right not to procreate,
enjoyed equally by married and single persons, and a right, implicitly
recognized by the cases as inhering in the marital relationship, to decide
whether or not to have children. The next question is whether this right
necessarily includes access to noncoital reproduction.
99. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
100. Some states still retain laws against fornication or nonmarital cohabitation. See infra
notes 216-18 and accompanying text. In cases dealing with access to contraception by unmar-
ried persons or minors, the Court has not questioned the state's right to criminalize the sexual
conduct underlying their use; rather, the Court has found that there was no rational relation-
ship between the prohibition against distribution of the devices and the state's asserted objec-
tive of discouraging illicit sexual relations. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1972);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-96 (1977). A fundamental right to coital
reproduction within marriage is apparent from the Court's general pronouncements concern-
ing autonomous decisionmaking about family matters. See supra notes 90-99 and accompany-
ing text.
101. Forced abortion obviously would constitute a violent violation of bodily integrity, to-
tally apart from any question of procreative rights. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)
(requiring a more substantial state interest than shown to justify forced surgery, under general
anesthesia, to remove a bullet from defendant's chest for evidentiary purposes); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced emetic to discover drugs violated the Due Process
Clause).
102. Justice Scalia has noted that "[t]he family unit accorded traditional respect in our
society, which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital
family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children." Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 n.3 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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2. Does Technology Make a Difference?
A strong argument can be made that those who have a "positive"
right to procreate 10 3 must have access to all available means to exercise
that right, including whatever noncoital reproductive techniques might
exist. After all, the same values are at stake, whether the conception of
the desired child has been accomplished through artificial insemination,
in a petri dish, or even in the body of a woman other than the rearing
mother who has agreed to be inseminated with the father's sperm and
thereafter relinquish her parental rights. Furthermore, the liberty inter-
ests protected by the Constitution do not change definition because of the
presence or absence of scientific technology as the means for their reali-
zation.1° "Assisted conception" is nonetheless conception, and arguably
no more "artificial" than the contraceptive devices to which a right of
access has been assured by Griswold and Eisenstadt.
The In re Baby M trial court adopted this line of reasoning and
specifically held that the constitutionally protected right of procreation
extended to the use of surrogacy, noting that
it must be reasoned that if one has a right to procreate coitally,
then one has the right to reproduce non-coitally. If it is the repro-
duction that is protected, then the means of reproduction are also
protected. The value and interests underlying the creation of fam-
ily are the same by whatever means obtained.10 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with this characterization of
the constitutional protection, stating that "[t]he right to procreate very
simply is the right to have natural children, whether through sexual in-
tercourse or artificial insemination. It is no more than that."10 6 The
court also reasoned that Mr. Stem's right of procreation ended when
Mrs. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with his sperm, and was not
determinative of the subsequent custody dispute. 0 7 Agreeing, one com-
mentator has stated that "the right to procreate is limited to the right to
103. Those asserting this procreative right may include unmarried persons as well as mar-
ried couples.
104. This principle is basic to Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-59 (1983), in which she decries the un-
workability of the Roe v. Wade trimester framework because scientific advances require con-
stant readjustment of the time periods at which state interests in maternal health and fetal
viability demand recognition: "[N]either sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide
cases based on the application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework
that varies ... according to the level of medical technology available when a particular chal-
lenge to state regulation occurs." Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 386, 525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (1987).
106. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 448, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (1988).
107. The two natural parents equally shared any rights to the custody and nurturing of the
child, protected either by New Jersey law or the Constitution. In the New Jersey Supreme
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make private choices, and does not include the right to make contracts
about reproduction and to ask the legal system to recognize or enforce
them."10' Another has put the matter more bluntly: "Privacy is not a
technocrat's toy, and does not require the government to keep its hands
off any method of procreation that inventors can devise."
10 9
Whether an appropriate definition of procreative liberty, as pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, should or should not be tied to con-
temporary scientific technology is not actually the salient issue for
evaluating the constitutionality of legislation concerning surrogacy.
Although surrogacy makes use of the technology of artificial insemina-
tion, the oldest, least exotic of the "reproductive technologies," it is first
and foremost a social arrangement-a contract that contemplates the
birth of a child and the child's ensuing custody and care. The ordering of
social arrangements is the central task of the legal system.110 One of its
chief functions always has been the formulation of rules governing the
formation and enforcement of cognizable contract rights. '1 Of course,
laws affecting contract rights, like any other laws, will not stand if they
contravene constitutional requirements. 112 An agreement about the cus-
tody, care, and nurturing of a child when the two natural parents of the
child are not cohabiting, however, is one kind of contract that our society
traditionally has recognized to be an appropriate concern of the legal
system, even when the parents are in accord on the matter.'1 3 This
agreement affects the rights not only of a mother and a father but also of
a third party-the child. Because children are incapable of speaking up
for their own rights, society has endowed the state with that power.
11 4
Moreover, because children are most at risk emotionally and psychologi-
cally, their rights must be considered paramount in any legislative or
Court's view, this fact minimized the relevance of any pre-existing custody agreement. 109
N.J. 396, 435-36, 448, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247, 1253-54 (1988).
108. Holder, supra note 7, at 53.
109. Annas, supra note 75, at 30 (emphasis in original).
110. See, e.g., the definition of "law" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1990):
"That which is laid down, ordained, or established. A rule or method according to which
phenomena or actions co-exist or follow each other. Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules
of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force."
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines a "contract" as "[ain agreement between two or
more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing." Id. at 322.
112. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
113. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, ch. 19, 786-849 (2d ed. 1988), esp. 786-87 (tracing the doctrine ofparenspatriae) and
807 (noting the freedom of courts to disregard parental agreements respecting custody, when
they find that the child's interests are not being served).
114. Id.
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judicial decision-making process.1 15 In other words, the best interests of
the child are precisely the kind of compelling state interest that can limit
or even vitiate a parent's liberty interests. 16 The best interests of the
resulting child formed the guiding principle of the Drafting Committee
of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act in formu-
lating the model legislation considered in this Article.I"
7
3. How May a State Define Procreative Liberty to Serve the Best Interests
of the Child?
The arguments thus far advanced support a state legislature's right
to choose Alternative B of the Act. 18 Based on the legislature's realiza-
tion of the pitfalls inherent in any surrogacy arrangement and on its eval-
uation of the best interests of the resulting children, it could choose to
prohibit this kind of contractual arrangement altogether. In the event
that a legislature chooses to legalize surrogacy arrangements, as contem-
plated by Alternative A, the above considerations could justify such re-
quirements of the Act as its screening and counseling provisions and the
limitation of approved surrogacy contracts to instances of functional
infertility. 119
115. Id.; see esp. id. at 786-88. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973); PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS (L. Weithom 1987).
116. Even the trial court in In re Baby M, after proclaiming that the Stems had a constitu-
tionally protected right to procreate by use of a surrogacy arrangement, acknowledged that
actual custody rights to the child must be determined by her best interests rather than by the
constitutional rights of any of the adults involved. The court based this conclusion on its
parens patriae jurisdiction, noting that "[a]n agreement between parents is inevitably sub-
servient to the considerations of best interests of the child." 217 N.J. Super. 313, 391, 525
A.2d 1128, 1167 (1987). In overruling the trial court's holding that the surrogacy contract
was valid, the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that "the trial court devoted the major
portion of its opinion to the question of the baby's best interests. The inconsistency is appar-
ent." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 417, 537 A.2d 1227, 1238 (1988).
117. See Robinson and Kurtz, supra note 9, as cited supra notes 26 and 35 and accompany-
ing text. The chairman and the reporter of the Committee note particularly that "[t]he narrow
scope and focus of the Act... develops a valid order that provides for the best interests of the
child." Id. at 494.
118. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 5, Alternative B.
119. See UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 6. Assuming, arguendo, that access to
surrogacy as a procreative means would be constitutionally protected (at least for married
couples) if the practice itself were legalized, these restrictions are no more than narrowly tai-
lored regulations designed to serve the state's compelling interest in the child's well-being and
in the physical and psychological health of the adult parties to the agreement. The comment
to § 6 emphasizes that all the judicial findings required therein were formulated primarily to
serve the best interests of children born of surrogacy and notes that these include protections
for the surrogate and intended parents as well. See also Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at
494:
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The due process argument, however, is that the "fundamental right
to bear or beget a child" necessarily includes access to any legal means of
procreation. 120 If state legislatures give surrogacy agreements legal rec-
ognition for those unable to procreate in any other way, the question
posed by Eisenstadt v. Baird is whether a state may limit its definition of
this right to married couples while denying it to unmarried persons. The
issue, in other words, becomes: Is there a fundamental right to procreate
outside the context of marriage? To answer this question, this Article
examines the source and nature of the Supreme Court's definitions of
"privacy" rights.
Constitutional protection does not extend to every action that one
can characterize as concerning an intimate personal relationship or a
matter of procreation and childrearing. Justice White recently character-
ized the appropriate process for defining the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause in the following manner:
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights
not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on
the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought to
identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial
protection. In Palko v. Connecticut ... it was said that this cate-
gory includes those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed." A different description of
fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. City of East Cleveland
... where they are characterized as those liberties that are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."... See also Griswold
v. Connecticut.
121
Justice Scalia, speaking for the plurality in Michael H. v. Gerald D., simi-
larly quoted Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland:
"'Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
In drafting Alternative A, the Committee considered carefully the respective rights
and duties of all parties in interest, the planning and review of all terms and compo-
nents in the arrangements, the guidance of the court, and the concern for those issues
necessary to provide the greatest protection for the child.
120. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937) and quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 506 (1965) (brackets in original). In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice
White went on to find that the Court's formulations of fundamental liberties did not extend to
a right to engage in homosexual sodomy, a practice that constituted a criminal offense at
common law and that the laws of the thirteen original states forbade at the time the Bill of
Rights was ratified. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
in this Nation's history and tradition.' "122 The Court held in Michael
H. that a California statute presuming the legitimacy of a child born dur-
ing marriage and barring a biological father from proving his paternity of
a child resulting from his adulterous relationship with the child's mother
did not violate the biological father's rights, even though the result in
that case was to cut off the relationship between himself and his issue.
Justice Scalia concluded that "our traditions have protected the marital
family ... against the sort of claim Michael asserts." '123 In other words,
the state's interest in preserving the values inherent in the traditional
marital family unit, composed of the marital couple and the child borne
by the mother, was sufficient to override any claims of the biological fa-
ther, despite his blood relationship with the child and the emotional at-
tachments that had developed between them.124 The Court looked to
history to find that the adulterous relationship giving rise to the claim-
ant's assertions was not one traditionally accorded protection by society,
but, rather, was one traditionally regarded with opprobrium.125
Recent pronouncements on the nature of autonomy rights thus
make clear that arguable factors of intimacy, personal identity, and self-
fulfillment alone will not trigger automatic constitutional protection.
These arguments have failed when courts have seen the relationship they
were called upon to serve as threatening to traditional family life126 or to
historical notions of morality.127 References to values and relationships
that society traditionally has been willing to protect provide shape and
substance to the "privacy rights" that often have seemed quite nebulous
in earlier decisions.12 It is especially relevant to the questions under
122. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989) (quoting 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
123. Id.
124. See 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2341-46 (1989).
125. Id. at 2342-44.
126. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
128. Legal commentators have argued that one should construe the "right of privacy" to
afford constitutional protection to any "intimate association" that two individuals might find
fulfilling. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). In his
dissent to Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun characterized the issue much more broadly
than did Justice White's majority opinion, stating, "[T]his case is about 'the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.' "
478 U.S. 186, 199 (quoting Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928)). While one easily can disagree with the Court's conclusion in this case, when
the only persons affected were the two consenting adults involved in the relationship, the con-
cerns for preservation of an ongoing marital unit and the best interests of a child make the
result in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), more defensible. At least in the
Michael H. case, the Court, upholding California's policy against "dual fatherhood," 109 S.
Ct. at 2339, avoided the potential confusion and psychological stress arguably inherent in the
Baby M result.
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consideration here that the specific result in Michael H. -that the child's
natural father lost all visitation rights, along with any claim to be called
her "parent"-hinged to a large extent on the lower court's evaluation of
the best interests of the child concerned.129 The best interests of the re-
sulting child are, of course, the guiding consideration in the Drafting
Committee's decision to restrict access to legalized surrogacy to "a man
and woman, married to each other."13
Viewed from this perspective, an obvious distinction exists between
the constitutional protection afforded to unmarried persons to exercise
the right not to procreate13 1 and any claim by such persons of a constitu-
tionally protected right of access to any legal means to procreate. The
right to contraception or abortion serves autonomy values and also re-
flects society's traditional interests in preventing the birth of illegitimate
children and preserving the marital family unit as a viable entity. The
use of assisted conception may serve autonomy values, but it also in-
volves the rights of another group-the children-who have a right to
governmental protection of their best interests, even in the face of the
quest for personal identity and self-fulfillment sought by adult would-be
parents.
If, as the cases indicate, our "history and traditions" are the bases
for defining the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause,1 32 then one
can make a strong argument that unmarried persons have no constitu-
tionally protected positive right to procreate, either by coital or noncoital
means. Any legislation denying them access to otherwise legal reproduc-
tive arrangements therefore need meet only a rational basis test.
133
Surely a legislature may reasonably conclude that the most desirable en-
vironment into which to introduce a child who is to be born pursuant to
a surrogacy arrangement 134 is one that will include two parents, a man
129. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2337-38 (1989).
130. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 1(3).
131. This right is protected by Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and their progeny.
132. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
133. This test for constitutionality, deriving from Chief'Justice John Marshall's famous
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), requires that courts uphold
legislation so long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. For pur-
poses of measuring validity under the Due Process Clause, courts will hold legislation to the
higher standard of "heightened scrutiny" only if it intrudes upon a liberty interest protected by
that Clause. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 11.5-11.7 (3d ed. 1986).
134. Whether or not children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements-or through use
of any of the other emerging "reproductive technologies"-might be psychologically adversely
affected by the circumstances of their births is a matter for debate. Time has yet to develop
telling empirical data on this point, although, as Martha Field suggests, "[ilt does not seem
that children born of surrogacy need experience greater feelings of rejection than those com-
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and a woman, who are married to each other. This family structure,
after all, exemplifies our "history and tradition," '35 which has been the
subject of special protection under the Due Process Clause. 36 A legisla-
ture might therefore reasonably assume this family structure will most
likely serve the best interests of the child to be born.
Even if the courts applied heightened scrutiny to the Act's marriage
requirement under a due process analysis,' 37 the legislation's objective
would survive the test. Serving the best interests of the children is not
only an important state interest, it is a compelling one.1 38 The question
then becomes whether the married-parent requirement is related to that
objective in a manner sufficiently substantial to justify its inclusion in
Alternative A of the proposed Act.
As the counterargument claims, 139 it is true that beginning life in
the context of a two-parent "traditional" family is no guarantee that a
child will grow up in that same configuration. An increasingly large
number of children today are brought up by single parents,"4 whether by
reason of divorce or separation, 4' death of a parent,142 or birth outside
wedlock' 43 -a status that has lost much of its former opprobrium. 1" A
mon to adopted children generally." M. FIELD, supra note 7, at 54 (but, noting that "reactions
vary, of course," she does cite some instances of AID children angry and grieved by their
inability to trace their biological origins). Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court was concerned
about "the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the offspring of
someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 441, 537
A.2d 1227, 1250 (1988); see infra note 221 and accompanying text.
135. For a strong defense of this position, see Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV.
463 (1983). For statements of the counter philosophy, see Note, Developments in the Law:
The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980).
136. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
137. The courts' analysis would be based on the theory that procreative liberty necessarily
encompasses access to all legal means of reproduction, including assisted conception.
138. H. CLARK, supra note 113, at 786-88 (tracing the doctrine ofparenspatriae and relat-
ing it to the "best interests of the child" standard in custody decision-making).
139. See, eg., Kritchevsky, supra note 8, at 32; M. FIELD, supra note 7, at 59-60.
140. In 1988, 72.7% of all children under age 18 were living with both parents, down from
85.2% in 1970. In 1988, 21.4% of all children were living with their mothers only, compared
to 10.8% in 1970; 2.9% were living with their fathers only, compared to 1.1% in 1970. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 69
(1990).
141. In 1988, 7.9% of all children under age 18 were living with divorced mothers, up from
3.3% in 1970. Furthermore, 5.3% of all children lived with mothers who were married but
whose husbands were absent, up from 4.7% in 1970. Id.
142. In 1988, 1.3% of all children under age 18 were living with widowed mothers, down
from 2% in 1970. Comparable statistics were not available for those living with fathers only.
Id.
143. In 1988, 6.8% of all children under age 18 were living with never-married mothers, up
from .8% in 1970. Id.
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strong case can be made that it is more psychologically damaging to a
child to grow up in a quarrelsome, tension-filled two-parent household
than to grow up with the stigma of illegitimacy or any other "lack" ac-
companying an otherwise loving association with a single parent. 145
Moreover, the fact that children begin life with a single parent does not
necessarily mean that is how they will grow up, any more than the con-
verse. Single parents frequently find mates with whom they form new or
"blended" family units.' 4 6 In light of these facts, a legislative require-
ment that only married couples may qualify as intended parents in a sur-
rogacy arrangement may indeed seem untenable, particularly if
heightened scrutiny is applied.
Nonetheless, our current knowledge of child psychology still sug-
gests that the best environment for a child's optimal development is the
stable, heterosexual, two-parent family. 47 Under the Act, the child will
144. See NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, supra note 65, at 12.
145. See, eg., J. BELSKY, R. LERNER, & G. SPANIER, THE CHILD IN THE FAMILY 32
(1984) ("[Flamily experts suggest that it is far better for a child to grow up in a loving home
with one parent than in a battleground with two."); MacKinnon, An Observational Investiga-
tion of Sibling Interaction in Married and Divorced Families, 25:1 DEVELOPMENTAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 36 (1989) (finding that interparental conflict was more determinative of negative
behavior in children than was actual marital status).
146. See Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NON-
TRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233, 281 (M. Lamb 1982)
(citing one study that found that after six years approximately 70% of divorced women and
80% of divorced men had remarried); Santrock, Warshak, & Elliott, Social Development and
Parent-Child Interaction in Father-Custody and Stepmother Families, in NONTRADITIONAL
FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 289; Felner & Terre, Child Custody Dis-
positions and Children's Adaptation Following Divorce, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS 106 (L. Weithorn 1987). But see Bumpass & Sweet, Children's Experience
in Single-Parent Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 21 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 256, 259 (Nov./Dec. 1989) (finding that only 36% of children
whose parents separate or who are born to an unmarried mother become part of a two-parent
family within five years and that overall, 53% will remain in a single-parent home throughout
childhood). See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WO-
MEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989).
147. Child care specialists and developmental psychologists vary in their willingness to
emphasize this point directly, although it is clearly an operating premise of much of their
work. Many point out that we simply lack sufficient research findings to make accurate gener-
alizations about the psychological effects of growing up in a single-parent family-particularly
the household of a never-married parent-partly because this is still a relatively new phenome-
non. Even studies of children of divorced parents may not be very helpful in this regard. This
is true partly because the divorce itself is a separate psychologically disruptive event, and
partly because divorce does not necessarily result in subsequent absence of the noncustodial
parent from the child's life. Dr. John Munder Ross, a clinical psychologist in New York
specializing in the father-child relationship, in commenting on father absence, has stated, "Re-
cent studies have pointed to four major deficiencies.... Fatherless kids have trouble with their
sexual identity, difficulty in feeling individual and separate from their mother, problems in
cognitive and intellectual functioning as revealed in school performance, and difficulty control-
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at least begin life this way. The Act's requirement for a home study and
a finding that the intended parents meet the state's standards of fitness
applicable to adoptive parents should go far to insure that the child will
be brought into a psychologically healthy environment, including a stable
marriage.148 A relationship with a parent of each sex provides a wider
range of interactions on a daily and intimate basis for the child.14 9 In the
ling aggressive impulses." Morrisroe, Mommy Only, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 6, 1983, at
23, 28. See also Sokoloff, Alternative Methods of Reproduction: Effects on the Child, 26
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 11, 14 (Jan. 1987) (commenting on the use of AID by single women
and raising doubts about whether "raising a child in the absence of a father even approaches
the best interests of the child"); accord, B. SPOCK AND M. ROTHENBERG, DR. SPOCK'S BABY
AND CHILD CARE 46 (1985) ("I feel, from pediatric and psychiatric experience, that, if possi-
ble, it is preferable for children to live with two parents (one may be a stepparent) if the
parents love and respect each other. Then the children will know both sexes realistically as
well as idealistically, and will have a pattern of marital stability to guide them when they are
adults."); see also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 115, at 16 (noting, as a
reason for developmental problems among children, "The prolonged absence or death of one
parent may place the child at risk. He is deprived of the benefits of a relationship with two
adults who have an intimate relationship with each other."). The authors cite the fact that a
1972-73 survey of the Child Psychiatry Unit of the Yale University Child Study Center's
caseload disclosed that 29% of the patients were from single-parent homes. Id at 114 n.2; cf
B. WHITE, THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF LIFE 300-01 (1985) (commenting, with respect to the
father's role in childrearing, that we lack sufficient research to know whether fathers make
unique contributions, and concluding that the ideal would consist of "(1) equal time for both
parents in raising babies, (2) along with part-time work ... for both parents, and (3) occasional
use of high-quality substitute child care"). Brazelton has noted the difficulties that single par-
ents have with their babies' and young children's moves toward independence, which can make
it more difficult for children to develop their separate sense of identity. See T. BRAZELTON,
ON BECOMING A FAMILY: THE GROWTH OF ATTACHMENT 185-199 (1981); T. BRAZELTON,
TODDLERS AND PARENTS: A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 71-98 (1974); cf. Weiss,
Growing Up a Little Faster: The Experience of Growing Up in a Single-Parent Household, 35:4
J. Soc. ISSUES 97 (1979) (noting that children who grow up in single-parent households may
mature faster than their peers, but they may also be resentful of their increased responsibility
or feel less secure after the withdrawal of the noncustodial parent). Most researchers concen-
trate on the factor of father (not mother) absence, although some also discuss situations in
which the father is the single parent. See, eg., T. BRAZELTON, TODDLERS AND PARENTS,
supra, at 88-98. See generally Rosenberg, Single Parent Adoption: An Issue of Difficulty and
Import for Adoption Agencies (National Comm. for Adoption 1987) (paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the North American Council on Adoptable Children, Aug. 8, 1987)
(noting the general lack of longitudinal studies, making resolution of the issue difficult, but
pointing to recent research about the differing interactions between infants and their mothers
and infants and their fathers, which suggests to Rosenberg that adoption agencies should not
consider single persons to be on an equal footing with married couples in making placement
decisions).
148. Although every state permits single parents to adopt, see infra notes 172-73 and ac-
companying text, the National Committee for Adoption has found that "[m]ost adoption agen-
cies place babies only with married couples .... And most birthmothers express a desire for
their child to be adopted by a married couple." NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, supra
note 65, at 162.
149. H. LYTTON, PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION: THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS OB-
SERVED IN TWIN AND SINGLETON FAMILIES 274-77 (1980); Lamb, Father-Infant and
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stable, heterosexual, two-parent family, there is both a same-sex adult
with whom the child can identify, and a member of the opposite sex from
whom the child can learn much that may otherwise be virtually unavaila-
ble. 15 Psychologists also observe that children receive value from living
in an adult-interactive environment, where they see two parents, each
with differing approaches and views, solving problems and making mu-
tual decisions.151 These observed behavior patterns provide a model for
the children's own relationships, which may include marriage.152
Even if the parents eventually separate, the child of two parents has
both emotional ties and legal rights that the single-parent child might
never attain. Many of the values arising from a relationship with a par-
ent of each sex can survive a marital breakup.153 In addition, legal rights
such as support, inheritance, and guardianship are important both to a
child's psychological well-being and to her overall physical situation in
the world. If one parent dies or becomes incapacitated, the child with
Mother-Infant Interaction in the First Year of Life, 48 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 167, 179 (1977)
("[I]nasmuch as their experiences with the two parents differ, it is plausible to argue that
infants develop different expectations and learn different behavior patterns from each parent
and thus that the two relationships have different consequences for sociopersonality develop-
ment."); see also J. BELSKY, R. LERNER, & G. SPANIER, supra note 145, at 51-56 (pointing out
differing maternal and paternal influences in such areas as infant socioemotional development);
id. at 61-62 (early childhood intellectual competence); id. at 71-74 (sex-role development).
150. F. DODSON, How TO FATHER 7, 10-11 (1974) ("Some aspects of fatherhood are inter-
changeable with similar aspects of motherhood. But certain phases are unique to the father
and only he can play this part of the parental role. If he fails to fulfill this role, his wife cannot
take over and do the job no matter how good a mother she is."); J. BELSKY, R. LERNER, & G.
SPANIER, supra note 145, at 71-74. Note also their finding that when there is a marital
breakup "several investigations indicate that sons and daughters alike function better when
reared in the home of the same-sex parent." Id. at 148; see also id. at 156 (noting adverse
effects on sex-role development in father-absent families for boys below the age of five and for
adolescent girls); cf B. SPOCK & M. ROTHENBERG, supra note 147, at 47 (emphasizing the
difference between gender identity and gender role, and declaring that it is the former function
that is important).
151. J. BELSKY, R. LERNER, & G. SPANIER, supra note 145, at 123-26. The dual-parent
household also is likely to create a healthier environment because the adults' mutual support of
each other (particularly the father's support of the mother) enables them to be better parents.
Id. at 126-30; cf B. White, supra note 147, at 301 ("A case can be made for the role of the
father, if not with respect to the welfare of children, then to that of parents."); see also Gongla,
Single Parent Families: A Look at Families of Mothers and Children, in ALTERNATIVES TO
TRADITIONAL FAMILY LIVING 5, 10-11 (H. Gross and M. Sussman 1982); MacKinnon, supra
note 145, at 36 ("Divorced mothers are less consistent and affectionate, communicate less well,
and are more restrictive than mothers in married families.").
152. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 145, at 42 (negative behavior between siblings may
simply mirror their parental models, whether the parents are married or divorced).
153. See, e.g., Gongla, supra note 151, at 18-19 (noting the growing awareness that "the
parental status remains after the marital status dissolves" and that positive father-child rela-
tionships after divorce are associated with "high self-esteem and the absence of depression in
children of both sexes and at all ages").
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two parents has obvious psychological and legal advantages. 54 Given all
of these circumstances, a state legislature is justified in requiring that the
intended parents in a state-approved surrogacy arrangement be "a man
and woman, married to each other."
B. The Equal Protection Argument: Who Is "Similarly Situated"?
A determination that access to legalized surrogacy either is not a
form of procreative liberty protected by the Constitution, or, even if it is,
that it may be regulated in the service of the best interests of the resulting
child, does not necessarily answer the equal protection concerns raised
by Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird. That case held that there was
no rational basis for distinguishing between married couples and single
persons on the issue of right of access to contraceptives.1 55 The princi-
ples of Eisenstadt present a serious challenge to the classification based
on marital status that determines who may have access to parenthood
through surrogacy under Alternative A of the Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that state legislatures provide similar treatment for those who are
similarly situated: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "156 The initial inquiry thus seeks
to identify the "object of the legislation," which can then be used to ana-
lyze persons as "similarly" or "dissimilarly" "circumstanced," in order
to determine whether the classification chosen is "reasonable, not arbi-
trary." If the objective reflects a legitimate concern of the government,
courts will defer to the legislature's judgment'57 on who is "similarly cir-
cumstanced," unless the classification chosen represents a suspect or
quasi-suspect category in the eyes of the Supreme Court, or unless a fun-
damental right is involved. 8 In the case of the Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act, the object of the legislation, as
154. See Morrisroe, supra note 147, at 29, which quotes one never-married mother:
I look at my son and shudder when I realize I'm all he's got .... As a single parent,
I also feel obligated to take good care of my health so that nothing will happen to
me.... It's a constant worry because no one will love him the way a mother loves
him.
155. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
156. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
157. See the discussion of the "rational basis test," supra note 133 and accompanying text.
158. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Justice White cogently
summarized equal protection doctrine:
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repeatedly stated by the Drafting Committee, is to serve the best interests
of the children resulting from assisted conception159-clearly a legitimate
state concern.16° According to the Drafting Committee's chairperson
and its reporter, that legislative mandate, received from the general Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, instilled a feeling of
"great urgency on the part of the Drafting Committee to provide a child
with two legal parents." 161 This in turn served the purpose of providing
children of assisted conception with the same basic rights as the vast
majority of children of natural conception.1 62 The rights under consider-
ation include both tangible interests, such as property and inheritance
rights, and less tangible ones, such as a sense of psychological security
and self-identity.
The classification chosen to achieve these ends was based upon mar-
ital status, which is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 63 The
remaining question, in light of Eisenstadt, is whether there is a rational
basis for distinguishing between married couples and unmarried persons
in the right of access to parenthood through surrogacy. 16" The same
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est.... When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause
allows the States wide latitude.., and the Constitution presumes that even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage,
or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy... because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest....
Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights
protected by the Constitution....
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of
review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treat-
ment.... A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest. . . . Because illegitimacy is beyond the
individual's control and bears "no relation to the individual's ability to participate in
and contribute to society," official discriminations resting on that characteristic are
also subject to somewhat heightened review.
Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted). The Court in Cleburne went on to hold that "the Court of
Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more
exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legisla-
tion." Id. at 442.
159. See generally Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9.
160. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
161. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 493.
162. Despite the increasing incidence of both divorce and illegitimacy, as of 1988, 72.1% of
children under the age of 18 lived with both parents. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note
140, Table No. 69.
163. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
164. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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considerations raised in the context of the due process argument-that as
far as we know, the best environment for a child's optimal development
is the stable, heterosexual, two-parent family-appear to supply an af-
firmative answer to this question as well.16
The issue is more complex than might appear at first blush, how-
ever, because the limitation is inconsistent with policies governing other
state-regulated means of achieving parentage: both adoption and AID
are accessible to unmarried persons. 16 6 Presumably, the same state con-
cern, serving the best interests of the affected children, is also at work in
these areas of state regulation. 67 In the latter instance (AID), the incon-
sistency in state policy raises the specter of possible gender-based dis-
crimination, which requires a higher standard than "reasonableness" to
be justifiable. Furthermore, even if the state can show a sufficient basis
for requiring that the "intended parents" of a child born pursuant to a
surrogacy contract be "a man and woman," does that thereby justify the
additional requirement that they also be "married to each other"? In
other words, is there a rational basis for distinguishing between married
and unmarried couples in this situation? Because the basic requirement
of the Equal Protection Clause is one of similar treatment for those who
are similarly situated, resolution of the inquiry requires a determination
of who is similarly situated.
165. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
166. The other major noncoital means of reproduction is in vitro fertilization (IM in
which egg and sperm are united in a petri dish and the embryo is then transferred for implan-
tation in a woman's body. Even more recent is gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), in
which ova and sperm are transferred by catheter to a woman's fallopian tubes, where fertiliza-
tion may take place. The Office of Technology Assessment estimates that these techniques
may help 10% to 15% of infertile couples who cannot otherwise be treated. OTA, INFERTIL-
rrY, supra note 10, at 7. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act would
cover children born as a result of these technologies, when the egg and sperm did not come
from the two social parents. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § l(1). These techniques,
however, need not receive separate consideration here, because if either the egg or the sperm in
an IVF or a GIFT case comes from a donor, the child's status will necessarily follow the
pattern of either AID or surrogacy. Either the gestational mother will also be the social
mother, in which case AID provides the appropriate framework of analysis, or the gestational
mother will be a surrogate, in which case a state's choice of Alternative A or Alternative B will
govern the situation.
167. This is clearly the case in adoption, in which the standard for decision-making is the
best interests of the child. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. Concern with the
best interest of the resulting child is less apparent in AID regulation, although general stipula-
tions that artificial insemination be performed by a licensed physician, that the husband con-
sent, and that the child is legally the child of a consenting husband all protect the health and
legal status of both the mother and the child. See, eg., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B
U.L.A. 301 (1988).
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1. Those Who Seek Parenthood Through Adoption and Those Who Seek
Parenthood Through Legalized Surrogacy
Adoption is the oldest and the most traditional state-sanctioned
means for either married or unmarried persons to achieve parenthood
outside coital reproduction.'68 The advent of legalized abortion, together
with the recent trend of single mothers who keep their babies, have re-
sulted in a dearth of the most "adoptable" children-white infants 169 -
and have played a large part in the demand for access to new reproduc-
tive technologies and arrangements. 170 Public policy regarding the crite-
ria regulating who may adopt is thus a logical starting point for
determining who should have access to other state-regulated means of
achieving parenthood, including legalized surrogacy. It could be argued
that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the standards
that should govern the two situations. This is particularly true because
the Act's surrogacy provisions largely follow an adoption model, specifi-
cally requiring home studies and findings that both the intended parents
and the surrogate and her husband, if any, meet the standards of fitness
applicable to adoptive parents in the jurisdiction. 171
All states permit both married and single persons to adopt, 172 typi-
cally in a statute listing eligible adoptive parents, with no stated prefer-
ences. 173 An adoption decree will always be based upon the best interests
168. Adoption did not exist at common law and is entirely a creation of state statute. It
has been described as "the state's response to the needs of children whose parents are unable or
unwilling to care for them . . .[and] the procedure by which the state attempts to find a
permanent home for those children who are without one." Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A
Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 1, 11 (1988). Every state has statutes
regulating the adoption procedure. For a brief history of adoption practice and a state-by-state
summary of state regulations, see NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, supra note 65, at 18-34.
169. Information published by the Child Welfare League of America reveals that
[i]n more recent years a much smaller proportion of adolescents who carry their
pregnancies to term are choosing adoption. Currently over 90% elect to parent their
children rather than plan adoption for them.... Although currently no nationwide
statistical information exists, adoption practitioners report that there continues to be
a decline in the number of white infants and preschool children in need of adoption.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 5 (rev. ed.
1988).
170. See Wadlington, supra note 10, at 466-67 (citing as reasons for the decreasing availa-
bility of children for adoption "legal availability of abortion and contraception; diminished
social and legal stigma accompanying illegitimacy; recognition of constitutional limits on legal
discrimination predicated on illegitimate status; greater economic opportunity and child care
services for single women; and changing male attitudes about child raising roles").
171. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 6(b)(3), (4).
172. H. CLARK, supra note 113, at 908; G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND
THE LAW 45-46 (1979).
173. E.g., The Uniform Adoption Act provides, "The following individuals may adopt: (1)
a husband and wife together although one or both are minors; (2) an unmarried adult; (3) the
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of the minor child, 74 however, and there is evidence that marital status
will be a relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factor in the
judge's decision. 175 A New York Family Court judge might well have
expressed a common bias in the following statement:
Adoption by a single person has generally and in this Court's
experience been sought and approved only in exceptional circum-
stances, and in particular for the hard-to-place child for whom no
desirable parental couple is available. In the universal view of both
experts and laymen, while one parent may be better than none for
the hard-to-place child, joint responsibility by a father and mother
contributes to the child's physical, financial and psychic security as
well as his emotional growth. This view is more than a matter of
present convention, anthropologists pointing out that the institu-
tion of marriage, which is a method of signifying commitment to
such joint responsibility, evolved in response to the need for two-
parent care of children.
176
Although agency adoption standards have eased since these words
were written in 1972,177 and the common practice of judges is to follow
agency recommendations, 171 the Child Welfare League of America's re-
unmarried father or mother of the individual to be adopted; (4) a married individual without
the other spouse joining as a petitioner, if the individual to be adopted is not his spouse, and if
... the petitioner and the other spouse are legally separated ....." UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3,
9 U.L.A. 20 (1971).
174. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 113, at 905-21. The Uniform Adoption Act speci-
fies that the Court is to enter a final decree of adoption only after it has determined "that the
adoption is in the best interest of the individual to be adopted." UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 13, 9
U.L.A. 41 (1971).
175. Annotation, Marital Status of Prospective Adopting Parents as Factor in Adoption Pro-
ceedings, 2 A.L.R.4TH 555 (1980), contains a: number of citations to court decisions in which
marital status was obviously a key factor in the adoption decision. See Comment, Single Fac-
tor Based on Petitioner's Marital Status Cannot Determine the Best Interests of the Child: In re
W.E.R., 663 S. W.2d 887 (Tex. 1983), 16 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 573 (1985).
176. Adoption of H., 69 Misc. 2d 304, 311-12, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235, 245 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1972) (footnotes omitted).
177. The 1969 Guidelines for Adoption Service published by the Child Welfare League of
America stated that " 'the agency should select families in which a husband and wife are living
together. Yet a single-parent applicant might be considered when no other home is available
for a specific child, and when the applicant is part of a family to which the child will have the
security of belonging."' Quoted in H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, CASES AND
PROBLEMS 553 (3d ed. 1980). The new guidelines, published in 1988, contain the following
section on Marital Status:
When applicants are married, the husband and wife should be living together and the
relationship should be of sufficient duration to give evidence of its stability.
Single parents (unmarried, widowed, or divorced) should be considered in accord-
ance with their ability to meet the needs of available children and not solely on the
basis of their marital status.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 169, at 50.
178. Homer Clark attributes the fact that "[a]doption statutes contain surprisingly few re-
strictions on the persons eligible to receive children for adoption" to "the intention to rely
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vised Standards for Adoption Service reflect a similar mindset.179 These
revised Standards make constant references to "adoptive parents"
throughout its guidelines, and acknowledge that "single applicants" are
among those groups from which adoptive parents can frequently be
found "for ethnic and racial minority, older, disabled, and emotionally
disturbed children." 180
It thus appears that there is substantial evidence for believing that
both adoption agencies and judges favor the married, two-parent family
for the overwhelming majority of the children whom they place through
adoption proceedings. Even if that were not the case, an analogy be-
tween state-sanctioned adoption and state-sanctioned surrogacy is weak.
Unlike the surrogacy situation, in which a child is to be deliberately con-
ceived, adoption policy deals with the difficult social problem of provid-
ing a desirable home for a child already in existence whose parents are
either unwilling or unable to provide a home. It is clearly preferable to
place children with even one loving parent willing to provide a home
than to keep children institutionalized or continually subjected to the va-
garies of foster care. Therefore, the unmarried would-be parent who ap-
plies to adopt an existing child and the unmarried would-be parent who
wishes to use surrogacy to bring about a new conception are not "simi-
larly situated" with respect to the governmental objective of serving the
best interests of children. A legislature may reasonably treat them differ-
ently without violating the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Those Who Seek Parenthood Through AID and Those Who Seek
Parenthood Through Legalized Surrogacy
Artificial insemination of a woman with the sperm of an anonymous
donor (AID)"' is a second means of achieving parenthood noncoitally
upon adoption agencies, either as part of the placement process itself or in investigating and
making recommendations to the courts, to screen out the unsuitable adoptive parents.. .. "
He goes on to note the considerable power that agencies have as a result, because "[t]he
agency's refusal to place a child with prospective adoptive parents, although it may theoreti-
cally be reviewable by the courts, as a practical matter will seldom be challenged." H. CLARK,
supra note 113, at 908.
179. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 169, at 6.
180. Id. Still speaking of these hard-to-place children, the Standards state, "The urgent
need for more adoptive families has led to... [s]electing single parents and those who already
have birth or adopted children." Id. See also the finding of the National Committee for Adop-
tion that "[m]ost adoption agencies place babies only with married couples." NATIONAL
COMM. FOR ADOPTION, supra note 65, at 162.
181. Artificial insemination by sperm from a woman's husband (AIH) is also, of course, a
possibility, and is somewhat more common than AID. See supra note 11. Because that prac-
tice raises no legal issues of parentage, it is not separately regulated and will receive no atten-
tion here. The Act, by its terms, does not apply to any pregnancy of a wife resulting from
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and is the oldest of the "reproductive techniques" designed to enable
couples or individuals to have biological children they might otherwise
be unable to conceive. 182 Thirty-one states have statutes providing that a
child conceived in this manner is the child of a consenting husband and
that if the donation was provided through a licensed physician, the se-
men donor is not legally the child's natural father.1 "3 AID is presumably
legal and available to all in the nineteen states that have not chosen to
enact specific laws governing the practice.
None of the thirty-one statutes currently in force requires that the
woman to be inseminated be married,"8 4 and several specifically contem-
plate that she may be unmarried."8 5 Thus, even though some of the leg-
islation's wording indicates a presumption of marriage,1 86 and even
though some court cases have granted parental rights to known semen
donors when the mother was single,187 there is no doubt that a state, by
enacting legalized surrogacy under Alternative A of the Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act, would be according different
treatment to those seeking parenthood through surrogacy and those
seeking it through AID.
1 8 1
fertilizing her egg with the sperm of her husband. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9,
§ 1(1); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973) (concerning AID).
182. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 242.
183. See id. at 243, for a chart listing thirty of the states with regulations and summarizing
their provisions. Since that report, Missouri has enacted a law regulating AID. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 2110.824 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (speaking in terms of "a wife," acting with the consent
of her husband and under the supervision of a licensed physician); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973). The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
does away with the licensed physician requirement to eliminate possible ambiguities concern-
ing the child's legal status in the event that the physician services were not used. It also
presumes paternity in the husband of any married woman who bears a child through assisted
conception and places the burden on her husband to show lack of consent. See UNIF. CON-
CEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 3.
184. See OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 242-46 (including summary chart of state
statutes at 242).
185. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Anderson 1986); 1985 Or. Laws
§§ 109.239-.243, 109.247.
186. The Office of Technology Assessment concludes that the presumption of a consenting
husband in some statutes leaves open the question of the legal effect if the woman is single.
OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 246.
187. C.M. v. C.C., 170 N.J. Super. 586, 407 A.2d 849 (1979); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179
Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986). The OTA finds these cases to be demonstrations
of "the strength of the judicial interest in ensuring two legal parents to a child born as a result
of artificial insemination." OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 247. The same result was
reached recently in In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
188. Adoption of the entire Act would of course result in differing treatment because the
Act itself governs the status of a child born through AID. See UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra
note 9, §§ 1-4; id. § 10 and accompanying comments.
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The equal protection argument is stronger here than in the adoption
scenario. First, there is no existing child who needs a home with a loving
parent. AID, like surrogacy, is used to bring into existence a child who
otherwise would not be born. One might well question whether a ra-
tional basis exists for distinguishing between the prerequisite qualifica-
tions to use AID versus those needed to use legalized surrogacy.
Secondly, the distinction in legislative treatment might be characterized
as gender-based discrimination, which must survive a higher level of judi-
cial scrutiny than a rational basis test.1 89 This argument arises from the
fact that a single woman who wishes to parent her own biological child
has the legal means to do so through the use of AID. A single man with
the same desire, however, can succeed in fathering his biological child
through assisted conception only if he has access to surrogacy.1 90 There-
fore, once surrogacy is given legal recognition, to prohibit its use by un-
married persons results in differing state treatment of access by
unmarried women and unmarried men to assisted conception.
Ultimately, the arguments that it is constitutionally impermissible
for state legislatures to establish different qualifications for access to le-
galized surrogacy and access to AID have no substance. The same argu-
ments used in this Article's due process discussion, suggesting that there
is no fundamental "positive" right to procreate possessed by single peo-
ple19 1 and certainly no fundamental right for single persons to have ac-
cess to noncoital reproductive techniques, 192 apply with equal force in
this context. The result is that all means of assisted conception, includ-
ing both AID and surrogacy, may be subjected to reasonable regulations.
Legislatures therefore are entitled to regulate different forms of assisted
conception in different ways, so long as those regulations are reasonable
in relation to the subject matter and seek to serve some permissible legis-
lative purpose.
A legislature's decision not to restrict access to AID to married
couples simply represents its realization that artificial insemination is ac-
complished easily by the parties themselves. The drafters of the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act even chose to eliminate
189. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
190. Noel Keane, one of the first brokers of surrogacy contracts in the United States, has
reported that "[s]ingle men are increasingly seeking surrogate mothers as a solution to having
children without romantic entanglements." N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 67, at 289-90.
191. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
the physician-assisted requirement found in many statutes, 193 on the
grounds that it was "not realistic in light of present practices in the field
of artificial insemination." '194 In the past, self-administered artificial in-
semination has led to questions and litigation concerning parental rights
with respect to children,' 95 a possibility that the drafters strongly sought
to avoid.1 96 If legal access to AID were restricted to married persons,
foreseeable circumventions of the marriage requirement would create the
kind of legal morass that now exists in unregulated surrogacy contracts.
Therefore, even though a legislature might reasonably find that a mar-
ried-parent situation is the best environment for a child, it also might
reasonably find that imposing the requirement when AID is used would
disserve the best interests of children who undoubtedly would be born
outside the statute's protections.
On the other hand, under the Act's proposed scheme for legalized
surrogacy, a legislature reasonably could impose a married-parent re-
quirement that it believed would serve the best interests of the resulting
193. See, e.g., § 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act, stipulating
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.... (b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for
use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973). Twenty-one states require that a physi-
cian perform the insemination. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 242.
194. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 4, comment.
195. In C.M. v. C.C., 170 N.J. Super. 586, 407 A.2d 849 (1979), the unmarried couple had
unsuccessfully sought the aid of a sperm bank to perform the artificial insemination. While
there, they learned enough about the technique to perform it themselves. Before the child was
born, C.M. broke off her relationship with C.C. and he successfully sued for visitation rights.
See also In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386,
224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (known donors of semen to single women were permitted parental
visitation rights; failure to meet the physician-assistance requirement was one factor in reach-
ing each decision); supra note 187 and accompanying text. The Office of Technology Assess-
ment has gone so far as to say that, given the potential ambiguities concerning the child's
legally cognizable parentage, even when the inseminated woman is married, "[t]he reasonable-
ness of State laws that directly or indirectly require a physician to perform artificial insemina-
tion is questionable." OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 244.
196. See, eg., the statement by the chairman and reporter of the Drafting Committee that
[t]he Act was designed primarily to effect the security and well-being of children
born and living in our midst as a result of assisted conception. The Conference's
Executive Committee and the general Conference [of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws], considering the plight of these children, some with five biological par-
ents, some with no readily identifiable biological parents, and some with other depri-
vations, determined that the greatest priority and first call on the energy and talent of
the Drafting Committee was to provide an act which addressed these and other
deficiencies.
Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 492.
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children. A surrogacy contract would be enforceable only if the required
court approval were secured before any artificial insemination pursuant
to the contract.1 97 Of course, unmarried persons and others seeking to
avoid the statute's strictures could continue to enter into surrogacy
agreements and take their chances that the surrogate would relinquish
custody of the child at birth. If she did not, however, the would-be par-
ent(s) would have no recourse. For example, a single man who entered
into such a contract with a surrogate might find either that the surro-
gate's husband would be the child's legally recognized father198 or that
the surrogate would have custody rights but he would be responsible for
child support under otherwise relevant state law.199 These dismal pros-
pects differ from the situation of the unauthorized use of AID, in which
the inseminated woman generally can count on having a child to rear, at
the very least.2 °° Thus, a legislature may conclude that it would be un-
reasonable, although desirable, to impose a married-parent requirement
for the use of AID, but entirely reasonable to impose such a restriction
on the use of surrogacy. Adults seeking parenthood through these differ-
ent techniques simply are not "similarly situated" from the standpoint of
a legislative objective to serve the best interests of the children to be con-
ceived. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that
they be treated identically.
A more serious equal protection challenge to the Act's requirement
that intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement be married arises from
the contention that this provision results in gender-based discrimination.
The effect of the requirement, when combined with either the Act's pro-
visions20 or any current state policy concerning AID,2°2 is that single
females have access to assisted conception for producing their own bio-
logical children, while single males do not.20 3 Although this argument
has an immediate appeal in light of Supreme Court decisions subjecting
197. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 5(b) (declaring void any agreement not ap-
proved by a court, as authorized by the statute).
198. If the surrogate is married and her husband is a party to the agreement, he will be the
child's legal father. Id.
199. If the married surrogate's husband was not a party to the agreement, or if the surro-
gate is single, paternity is determined by other state law. Id.
200. Although a woman in this situation might find that the known semen donor had pa-
rental visitation rights, see supra notes 187 and 195 and accompanying text, she realistically
could expect to retain custody unless the state had other reasons for terminating her parental
rights.
201. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, §§ 1-4.
202. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
203. The problem of the single male wishing to use a surrogacy arrangement in order to
sire a child to rear is considered in Clark, New Wine in Old Skins: Using Paternity-Suit Settle-
ments to Facilitate Surrogate Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. L. 483 (1986-87).
gender-based discrimination to heightened judicial scrutiny,2" it, too, ul-
timately fails.
The operative legislative classification in the surrogacy provisions of
the Uniform Act is marital status, not gender. Marital status never has
been held to trigger heightened constitutional consideration.20 The fact
that reasonable regulations designed to serve the best interests of children
resulting from different means of assisted conception result in different
consequences for single women and single men is not the end product of
invidious discrimination. "Invidious discrimination" stems from a "pur-
poseful" classification consciously employed by the legislature.20 6 In the
case of gender-based discrimination in particular, the classification must
operate in a manner that is not substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental interest.
20 7
In this instance, a comparison of the differing legislative treatment
of AID and of legalized surrogacy by the Act and other current state
policies simply does not support a conclusion of a purposeful, gender-
based distinction. The Supreme Court's decision in Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 208 provides important insight. In that
case, the Massachusetts law giving veterans who qualified for state civil
service positions a lifetime preference was challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause on the grounds that the statute's operation overwhelm-
ingly favored males. The Court held the preference was valid because
the statute was neutral on its face, did not represent purposeful discrimi-
nation or a pretext for such discrimination,20 9 and served otherwise valid
legislative purposes. Of course, some females did qualify for the prefer-
204. See, eg., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
205. The Court decided Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), on a rational basis test.
See also supra note 158 for a summary of current equal protection doctrine as stated by Justice
White in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
206. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at 1502-05, citing, inter alia, Personnel Admin-
istrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (discussed infra notes 208-10, and accompanying text).
207. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
208. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
209. One particularly relevant portion of Justice Stewart's opinion states:
The appellee's ultimate argument rests upon the presumption, common to the
criminal and civil law, that a person intends the natural and foreseeable conse-
quences of his voluntary action.... The decision to grant a preference to veterans
was of course "intentional." So, necessarily, did an adverse impact upon nonveterans
follow from that decision. And it cannot seriously be argued that the Legislature of
Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men. It would thus
be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women
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ence in Feeney.21 0 It is likewise true in the present instance that some
single females will be just as adversely affected by the marriage require-
ment in the Act's surrogacy provisions as single males.2 ' These would
include women who are infertile and therefore cannot use AID and wo-
men who cannot gestate and would therefore like to implant ova in a
surrogate for artificial insemination. The criteria employed by Justice
Stewart in Feeney are equally valid here. The policy of imposing differ-
ent marital status criteria for access to AID and access to surrogacy is a
gender-neutral policy on its face that does not represent purposeful gen-
der-based discrimination or any pretext for such discrimination and that
serves an otherwise valid legislative purpose-the best interests of the
resulting children. Therefore, even though a single male does not have
access to assisted conception through surrogacy, while a single female
does through AID, there is no occasion for heightened judicial scrutiny.
The two are not "similarly situated" within the confines of traditional
equal protection prohibitions.
3. Married Versus Unmarried Couples: Does It Reasonably Make a
Difference?
Does the reasonableness of a legislature's belief that the best envi-
ronment for a child's optimal development is the stable, heterosexual,
two-parent family212 automatically validate the additional stipulation
that the parents be "married to each other"? Or might there be a strong
argument that married and unmarried heterosexual couples who meet
the state's criteria for adoptive parents should be considered "similarly
situated" for purposes of assessing their candidacy for parenthood
through a legalized surrogacy arrangement?
21 3
The number of cohabiting couples in the United States has risen
were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they
were not foreseeable.
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or in-
tent as awareness of consequences .... It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case
a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Id. at 278-79 (citations and footnote omitted). The same statements apply to the policies em-
bodied in the surrogacy provisions of the Act.
210. Only a very few women qualified for Massachusetts' veterans preference. At the time
of the litigation, only 1.8% of the veterans in Massachusetts were female. Id. at 270.
211. Noel Keane reports that "some single women are seeking surrogate mothers for the
same reason as single men. Unlike the males, however, the women will have to take an extra
step and find a sperm bank or anonymous donor willing to provide the semen for artificial
insemination .... " N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 67, at 290.
212. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
213. A recent survey of surrogacy matching services conducted by the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment revealed that at least 90% of the clients were married couples; but there were
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dramatically in recent years; their households often include children.214
Social acceptance of this type of living arrangement also has evolved,2
15
and remaining legal prohibitions are universally ignored.216
Nonetheless, public policy has not reversed itself to the point of out-
right endorsement. Some courts have held fornication and cohabitation
statutes violative of privacy rights protected by the federal Constitu-
tion.217 Laws prohibiting cohabitation remain on the books in nine
states, and eleven states (five of which also have cohabitation statutes)
make fornication illegal. Even when no such prohibitions exist, states
generally do not accord to cohabitation arrangements the kinds of legal
protections afforded marriage, such as rights to property division upon
breakup.218 A legislature therefore reasonably may distinguish between
married couples and unmarried, cohabiting couples when it establishes
criteria for access to legalized surrogacy.
Although many cohabitation relationships undoubtedly include a
deep commitment by the couple, a legislature reasonably might conclude
that couples who have not formalized their living arrangement with the
social and legal ties of marriage are more likely to separate than are mar-
ried couples. 219 Although the success of any marriage is not guaranteed,
five reports of unmarried couples accepted by agencies to match with surrogate mothers.
OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 269.
214. In 1988 almost 2.6 million unmarried heterosexual couples lived together, up from
fewer than 1.6 million couples in 1980 and just over .5 million in 1970. Almost one-third of
cohabiting couples in 1988 had one or more children under the age of 15 in the household.
Not quite half of the cohabiting adults previously had been married. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, supra note 140, Table No. 54.
215. NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND & R. CHEROW-O'LEARY, THE
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS 15 (1987). See generally I. SLOAN,
LIVING TOGETHER: UNMARRIEDS AND THE LAW (1980); G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 172.
216. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986). The court vacated a lower
court ruling on the constitutionality of Virginia's fornication and cohabitation statutes, finding
that no case or controversy existed because there was no real basis for fear of prosecution. The
court noted that no one had been convicted under the fornication statute since 1849, and the
last recorded conviction for private, consensual cohabitation occurred in 1883. Id. at 1204.
217. See New Jersey v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); see also Doe v. Dul-
ing, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985) (holding Virginia's fornication and cohabitation statutes
unconstitutional), vacated, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986).
218. I. SLOAN, supra note 215; G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 172.
219. One source states that observers have generally traced cohabitation arrangements to
three types of situations: (1) trial marriage; (2) financial considerations (either fearing a loss of
Social Security or pension benefits if the partners were to marry or living together to reduce
expenses); and (3) preference for cohabitation rather than "the long-term, permanent legal
commitment of marriage." A. HEMPHILL & C. HEMPHILL, WOMANLAW 78 (1980). The
second reason frequently applies to older persons. Either the first or third (as well as the
second, when it applies to a younger couple) lends credibility to a legislature's potential doubts
about the long-term stability of the relationship. The instability of cohabitational unions is
also noted in Thornton, Cohabitation and Marriage in the 1980s, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 497 (Nov.
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children born pursuant to a surrogacy contract are more likely to enjoy
the stability of the two-parent situation sought by the Act if they begin
life with a man and woman who have made this kind of commitment to
each other. In addition, the legal rights of marriage partners vis-A-vis
each other also serve to protect the child, particularly if there should be a
separation or divorce.220
.The emotional and psychological health of the child born of surro-
gacy is a primary concern of the state. The effects of such origins on a
child's sense of security and self-identity will necessarily remain specula-
tive for some time.22' It stands to reason, however, that any adverse
psychological consequences would only be exacerbated by children's per-
ceptions of a tenuousness in the relationship between their rearing par-
ents, as this is the bedrock for any child's growth and development. A
state legislature is entitled to protect children's chances for optimal de-
velopment by demanding that a man and woman who wish to become
parents through surrogacy be married to each other.2 22 From the per-
spective of the legislature's goal to serve the best interests of children
1988); Bennett, Blanc & Bloom, Commitment and the Modern Union: Assessing the Link Be-
tween Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Stability, 53 AM. Soc. REV. 127 (Feb.
1988).
220. For example, divorce would entail an equitable division of property between the par-
ties and perhaps alimony to one spouse. These would supplement the children's support rights
(which would obtain in any case) to enhance their economic well-being in the custodial par-
ent's household. A dissolution of a nonmarital union generally would not include rights to a
property settlement or alimony payments. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
221. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed concern about these effects. See supra note
134. Sokoloff has raised similar doubts. Sokoloff, supra note 147, (concerning children con-
ceived by AID). A policy statement issued by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists expresses concern about "adverse psychological effects" on children of both
AID and surrogacy and notes that there are "no data" addressing the issue. AMERICAN COL-
LEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, STATEMENT OF POLICY, ETHICAL IssuEs IN SUR-
ROGATE MOTHERHOOD (May 1983). Parents using AID often keep the fact secret from their
children; 84% of married couples surveyed in one study did not plan to tell their children of
their AID origins. Leeton & Backwell, A Preliminary Psychosocial Follow-Up of Parents and
Their Children Conceived by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), 1 CLINICAL REPRODUC-
TION AND FERTILITY 307 (1982). Maintaining secrecy appears more problematical if the par-
ent is single or when surrogacy is involved, because family and friends will know whether a
woman was pregnant. When children are aware of their AID origins, there is some evidence
of adverse reaction. See M. FIELD, supra note 7, at 54 (noting both negative and positive
reactions to such knowledge); R. SNOWDEN & G. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 85-90
(1983) (containing three letters written by AID children, each reacting quite negatively to the
situation).
222. In those jurisdictions that do make cohabitation or fornication illegal, despite the fail-
ure to enforce those laws, it would be a markedly inconsistent public policy to permit a couple
engaged in an illicit relationship to receive a court's imprimatur as a household that would
serve the best interests of a child born of surrogacy. Even when the couple's living arrange-
ment is not explicitly illegal, it is still likely to be an object of opprobrium in the society in
which such a child will grow up, perhaps making her a victim of social stigma.
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resulting from legalized surrogacy, married couples and unmarried
couples are not "similarly situated" under the Equal Protection Clause.
4. The Intended Parents and the Surrogate: A Statutory Inconsistency
One troubling aspect of the marriage requirement of the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act is that it applies only to
the "intended parents" in a surrogacy arrangement and not to the surro-
gate herself. Yet, if the surrogate supplies the egg (the usual case),22 3 she
has a right to terminate the agreement for 180 days following the last
insemination under the contract. 224 If she exercises her right and is un-
married,225 the child will not live in a home with "a man and woman,
married to each other. ' 226 Because at the time of conception both an
egg-donating surrogate and the intended parents have the potential for
providing the child's eventual custodial home, they are arguably "simi-
larly situated," and should therefore be subjected to the same marriage
requirement.227
Again, however, it is important to remember that the measuring
standard for classification by marital status is reasonableness. A legisla-
ture might require the intended parents in a surrogacy contract to be
married, but not impose that same requirement on the surrogate, for sev-
eral reasons. To begin with, the entire agreement is premised on the as-
sumption that the surrogate will not be the rearing parent. The
surrogate's recantation right is narrowly circumscribed, and the psycho-
logical counseling mandated for all parties228 should go far towards in-
223. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 267.
224. UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 7(b).
225. If the surrogate is married and her husband was a party to the agreement, he is the
child's legal father. If the surrogate's husband was not a party to the agreement, or if she is
unmarried, paternity is determined by otherwise relevant state law. Id. § 8(a)(2). Because the
child's biological father would be known, either of the last two possibilities might result in a
custody dispute such as occurred in In re Baby M.
226. The child, however, might still have "two legal parents," as the Drafting Committee
sought to provide. See Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 493. Either the surrogate's hus-
band, though not a party to the agreement, would be the child's legal father (perhaps subject to
rebuttal of the statutory presumption with physical evidence, see, e.g., the California statute at
issue in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) and supra notes 122-23 and accompa-
nying text), or the child's biological father, as the known semen donor, might have the right to
legitimate the child, or at least might be entitled to assert parental rights. Cf. Jhordan C. v.
Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo.
1989); C.M. v. C.C., 170 N.J. Super. 586, 407 A.2d 849 (1979); supra notes 187 and 195 and
accompanying text.
227. The new Virginia statute requires the surrogate in a court-approved arrangement to be
married; her husband must also be a party to the agreement. 1991 Va. Acts Ch. 600 (Mar. 25,
1991) at § 20-160.
228. UNIF. CONCEPTION AT, supra note 9, § 6(b)(7).
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suring the selection of surrogates who will remain comfortable with their
agreements.229
A requirement that surrogates be married would eliminate approxi-
mately forty percent of potentially suitable candidates.2 30  Given the
heavy presumption that the surrogate will abide by the contract, 231 a ba-
sic statutory purpose of providing biologically related children to loving
parents arguably would be disserved by imposing a marriage requirement
on the surrogate. Furthermore, the requirement would be inconsistent
with state policy regarding artificial insemination generally, as single wo-
men in all states are permitted access to AID.2 3 2 An unmarried woman
might argue successfully that the state could not, consistent with due
process and equal protection principles, deny her the right to artificial
insemination for the purpose of serving as a surrogate while permitting
her to receive AID for the purpose of bearing a child that she intended to
bring up by herself.23 3 Thus, the intended parents and the surrogate are
not "similarly situated" with respect to the legislative purpose of serving
the best interest of a child conceived through surrogacy. There are suffi-
cient distinctions between them to survive an equal protection challenge
under a rational basis test.
5. The Intended Parents: Uniquely Situated
Comparing surrogacy with other noncoital procreative techniques
and arrangements demonstrates that the intended parents' position in a
surrogacy contract is sufficiently distinguishable from the resulting par-
ents' situation in those other instances that state policies may rationally
differentiate between them. Children requiring adoption are served bet-
ter by one loving parent than by an institution.234 Fertile single women
seeking AID could easily circumvent a prohibition, thereby creating a
large group of children whose confusing legal status could only work to
their psychological detriment. Unmarried couples do not offer the same
229. An additional protection lies in the requirement that the surrogate must have had at
least one pregnancy and delivery. Id. § 6(b)(6). The judge also must make specific findings
that "all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and understand its terms, nature,
and meaning, and the efflect of the proceeding," id. § 6(b)(5), and that "the agreement will not
be substantially detrimental for the interest of any of the specific individuals." Id. § 6(b)(10).
230. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 10, at 273-74.
231. The OTA survey discovered that "the majority of surrogacy arrangements proceed
without judicial involvement, with few reported instances of parties reneging on their agree-
ments." Id. at 268. The additional protections provided by the Act should reduce the inci-
dence of surrogates who wish to change their minds.
232. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
233. This assumes, of course, that the unmarried woman otherwise meets all the criteria
required by the Act. See UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 6.
234. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT supra note 115, at 32 (1973).
potential for stability as those already married,235 a factor the state might
consider especially acute in a new area of social experimentation. As the
surrogate herself is not expected to be the rearing parent, her marital
status is of less consequence.
Even so, a state legislature examining the Act might be well advised
to consider imposing the marriage requirement on an egg-donating sur-
rogate236 as well as on the intended parents. If a married egg-donating
surrogate exercises her termination right within 180 days of the last in-
semination under the contract, her husband will be the child's legal fa-
ther, so long as he was a party to the contract.237 While the intended
parents would suffer profound disappointment, and certainly should re-
cover all expenses and fees paid under the contract, the legal status of the
child would be protected, and her parents would be "a man and woman,
married to each other." On the other hand, if an egg-donating surrogate
who recants is unmarried, the known biological father is likely to dispute
custody, and the stage would be set for another Baby M case. Because
avoidance of this possibility was a major impetus for the court supervi-
sion established by Alternative A of the Act and arguably should be a
major concern for any legislation clarifying the legal status of a child
born of surrogacy,23s a legislature seeking to guarantee that children will
have two legal parents should include clear requirements that the surro-
gate be a married woman and that her husband join in the contract.239 A
single woman's argument that she could resort legally to AID to have a
child to rear and therefore cannot be denied insemination for surrogacy
purposes is ultimately unpersuasive. The entire point of Alternative A of
the Act is that surrogacy is a new form of social arrangement for our
society. It therefore requires differing treatment from all other social ar-
235. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
236. See UNIF. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 7(b). A surrogate who has not provided
the egg does not have a recantation right under the Act.
237. Id. § 8(a)(2).
238. See Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 9, at 494 ("Because of the limited focus of the Act,
we believe it will eliminate the need for protracted litigation."). See generally Case Review
Essays on the New Jersey Supreme Court Baby "M" Decision, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
113 (1988) (including Rothenberg, Baby "M," the Surrogacy Contract, and the Health Care
Professional: Unanswered Questions, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 113; Smith, The Case
of Baby "M". Love's Labor Lost, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 121; Bezanson, Solomon
Would Weep: A Comment on In the Matter of Baby "M" and the Limits of Judicial Authority,
16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 126).
239. This requirement actually could have the effect of minimizing the number of recanta-
tions. A strong likelihood exists that a surrogate's husband would not wish to take on the legal
responsibilities of fatherhood for another man's biological child and would urge his wife to
abide by the contract. A single surrogate, on the other hand, might be more likely to look
upon the child as a potential source of love and companionship.
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rangements, particularly as the basic concern at stake is the best interest
of the child to be conceived. A legislature seeking to provide maximum
protection for such children might well require that they have legal sta-
tus in the home of a married couple from the beginning. 2'
6. Heightened Scrutiny and Equal Protection Analysis
Even if heightened scrutiny should be deemed appropriate under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Act's grant of access to surrogacy solely to
married couples is neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. 4U It is not
overinclusive because not all marital couples qualify for the statute's fa-
vored treatment. Couples also must pass the hurdles of satisfying the
home study, undergoing psychological counseling, and convincing a
judge that their participation in a surrogacy agreement as intended par-
ents will not be detrimental to their interests.24 2 All of these standards
must be met before a court will grant the requisite approval to validate
the contract.243 A state legislature that wishes to add to these qualifica-
tions is free to do so, and such a possibility is specifically contemplated
by the Act.2 "
The classification by marital status also is not underinclusive in a
manner that cannot survive heightened scrutiny. Undoubtedly there are
single individuals and unmarried couples who would make warm, loving
parents and who would meet all other criteria required by Alternative A
of the Act. Even so, current knowledge of psychological development
tells us that these persons cannot provide the optimum conditions for a
child's sense of identity and security,245 particularly when the child has
been born pursuant to the terms of a surrogacy agreement. 246 A child
derives benefits from interacting with two parents of opposite sex and
from living in an environment in which those adults themselves interact
in positive ways.247 These benefits, combined with the high value that
our society places on the institution of marriage, particularly for the rear-
240. Of course, the marital union could be severed at any time after conception, in the
household of either the intended parents or the surrogate. This risk, however, is no different
from that inherent in natural procreation by a married couple, and is probably lower because
of the protections provided by the home study.
241. See L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at 1446-50, for a general discussion of "underinclusive-
ness" and "overinclusiveness" (noting that legislation measured by a rational basis test is
rarely invalidated for underinclusiveness).
242. UNn'. CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 9, § 6; see also supra notes 42-54 and accompa-
nying text.
243. UNIF. CONCEPTION AT, supra note 9, § 6(b).
244. Id. § 6(b)(8).
245. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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ing of children, create an atmosphere in which the child of a stable, het-
erosexual marriage is virtually bound to have more opportunities to
thrive than is the child who lacks that background.248 Because the best
interests of the resulting children are paramount, legislatures may justifi-
ably choose to require that background for children born pursuant to
surrogacy agreements bearing the state's specific approval.
III. Conclusion
The marriage requirement for intended parents is only one aspect of
the overall regulatory scheme imposed by the Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act upon those seeking parentage through
legalized surrogacy. This Article has examined potential constitutional
objections to that particular provision because it appears to be one of the
provisions most vulnerable to attack and also one of the most likely bases
for attack upon the proposed Act. The concepts examined in this Arti-
cle, particularly substantive due process considerations, are equally ap-
plicable to other objections that might be raised against the Act on
constitutional grounds. Such objections include attacks upon the notion
of any governmental regulation in this area at all. Even if it is conceded
that state legislatures have the power to prohibit surrogacy arrangements
altogether, the constitutionally protected right of privacy, if broadly ap-
plied to legalized surrogacy, would virtually nullify the legislature's
power to regulate this new form of social arrangement. Once constitu-
tional rights are defined to include a given sphere of human activity,
principled line-drawing within that sphere becomes an extremely difficult
proposition. If state legislatures deem themselves faced with a bald
choice between prohibition and legalization of surrogacy, the likelihood
of their choosing the more conservative route seems high indeed. Ironi-
cally, the "constitutionalization" of this family law area might very well
inhibit the experimentation with expanded possibilities for achieving par-
entage that advocates of procreative liberty seek to bring about.
Points made by commentators249 who favor broad procreative liber-
ties concerning the self-actualization and fulfillment experienced by
adults through parenthood are well taken. Mutually enriching relation-
ships of love and growth between parent and child can flourish whether
or not the child was conceived in the "usual" way and whether two par-
ents are involved or only one. Changing social attitudes have already
removed much of the stigma of birth outside wedlock, and the traditional
248. Id.
249. See, eg., sources cited supra note 7.
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nuclear family250 is increasingly the exception rather than the norm.
Into this social flux new technologies and arrangements of "assisted
conception" are becoming available and may one day make our current
structures and norms seem quite outmoded. Nonetheless, as we start
down a path that may contain social and psychological pitfalls, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the children whose existence we plan and
bring about are the innocent and unwitting repositories of our experi-
mentation. Whether they become victims or beneficiaries of our social
and genetic planning depends upon the wisdom of our actions. These
future children deserve to have their best interests placed first in our hier-
archy of social values. Their interests are paramount even in the face of
the strong, natural longings of adult would-be parents, whether married
or single, who seek the assistance offered by reproductive technology.
As we set our course of social planning for this promising future, we
owe it to the children we are creating to proceed with caution. The day
may come when our understanding of human psychology will be suffi-
cient to free us for more expansive definitions of family structuring, even
in the planning stage. Until then, the legislative bodies responsible for
effectuating our social decision-making are entitled to proceed with cir-
cumspection if they so choose. The Constitution that shelters our most
cherished values does not require that they behave differently.








(1) "Assisted conception" means a pregnancy resulting from (i) fer-
tilizing an egg of a woman with sperm of a man by means other than
sexual intercourse or (ii) implanting an embryo, but the term does not
include the pregnancy of a wife resulting from fertilizing her egg with
sperm of her husband.
(2) "Donor" means an individual [other than a surrogate] who pro-
duces egg or sperm used for assisted conception, whether or not a pay-
ment is made for the egg or sperm used, but does not include a woman
who gives birth to a resulting child.
(3) ["Intended parents" means a man and woman, married to each
other, who enter into an agreement under this [Act] providing that they
will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate through assisted concep-
tion using egg or sperm of one or both of the intended parents.]
(4) "Surrogate" means an adult woman who enters into an agree-
ment to bear a child conceived through assisted conception for intended
parents.
SECTION 2. MATERNITY
[Except as provided in Sections 5 through 9,] a woman who gives
birth to a child is the child's mother.
SECTION 3. ASSISTED CONCEPTION BY MARRIED WOMAN
[Except as provided in Sections 5 through 9,] the husband of a wo-
man who bears a child through assisted conception is the father of the
child, notwithstanding a declaration of invalidity or annulment of the
marriage obtained after the assisted conception, unless within two years
after learning of the child's birth he commences an action in which the
mother and child are parties and in which it is determined that he did not
consent to the assisted conception.
SECTION 4. PARENTAL STATUS OF DONORS AND DE-
CEASED INDIVIDUALS
[Except as otherwise provided in Sections 5 through 9:]
(a) A donor is not a parent of a child conceived through assisted
conception.
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(b) An individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or
before a child is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using
the individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.
ALTERNATIVE A
[SECTION 5. SURROGACY AGREEMENT
(a) A surrogate, her husband, if she is married, and intended parents
may enter into a written agreement whereby the surrogate relinquishes
all her rights and duties as a parent of a child to be conceived through
assisted conception, and the intended parents may become the parents of
the child pursuant to Section 8.
(b) If the agreement is not approved by the court under Section 6
before conception, the agreement is void and the surrogate is the moiher
of a resulting child and the surrogate's husband, if a party to the agree-
ment, is the father of the child. If the surrogate's husband is not a party
to the agreement or the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is
governed by [the Uniform Parentage Act].
SECTION 6. PETITION AND HEARING FOR APPROVAL OF
SURROGACY AGREEMENT
(a) The intended parents and the surrogate may file a petition in the
[appropriate court] to approve a surrogacy agreement if one of them is a
resident of this State. The surrogate's husband, if she is married, must
join in the petition. A copy of the agreement must be attached to the
petition. The court shall name a [guardian ad litem] to represent the
interests of a child to be conceived by the surrogate through assisted con-
ception and [shall] [may] appoint counsel to represent the surrogate.
(b) The court shall hold a hearing on the petition and shall enter an
order approving the surrogacy agreement, authorizing assisted concep-
tion for a period of 12 months after the date of the order, declaring the
intended parents to be the parents of a child to be conceived through
assisted conception pursuant to the agreement and discharging the
guardian ad litem and attorney for the surrogate, upon finding that:
(1) the court has jurisdiction and all parties have submitted to
its jurisdiction under subsection (e) and have agreed that the law of
this State governs all matters arising under this [Act] and the
agreement;
(2) the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable
to do so without unreasonable risk to an unborn child or to the
physical or mental health of the intended mother or child, and the
finding is supported by medical evidence;
(3) the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home study
of the intended parents and the surrogate and a copy of the report
of the home study has been filed with the court;
(4) the intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's
husband, if she is married, meet the standards of fitness applicable
to adoptive parents in this State;
(5) all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and
understand its terms, nature, and meaning, and the effect of the
proceeding;
(6) the surrogate has had at least one pregnancy and delivery
and bearing another child will not pose an unreasonable risk to the
unborn child or to the physical or mental health of the surrogate or
the child, and this finding is supported by medical evidence;
(7) all parties have received counseling concerning the effect of
the surrogacy by [a qualified health-care professional or social
worker] and a report containing conclusions about the capacity of
the parties to enter into and fulfill the agreement has been filed
with the court;
(8) a report of the results of any medical or psychological ex-
amination or genetic screening agreed to by the parties or required
by law has been filed with the court and made available to the
parties;
(9) adequate provision has been made for all reasonable
health-care costs associated with the surrogacy until the child's
birth including responsibility for those costs if the agreement is ter-
minated pursuant to Section 7; and
(10) the agreement will not be substantially detrimental to the
interest of any of the affected individuals.
(c) Unless otherwise provided in the surrogacy agreement, all court
costs, attorney's fees, and other costs and expenses associated with the
proceeding must be assessed against the intended parents.
(d) Notwithstanding any other law concerning judicial proceedings
or vital statistics, the court shall conduct all hearings and proceedings
under this section in camera. The court shall keep all records of the
proceedings confidential and subject to inspection under the same stan-
dards applicable to adoptions. At the request of any party, the court
shall take steps necessary to ensure that the identities of the parties are
not disclosed.
(e) The court conducting the proceedings has exclusive and continu-
ing jurisdiction of all matters arising out of the surrogacy until a child
born after entry of an order under this section is 180 days old.
SECTION 7. TERMINATION OF SURROGACY AGREEMENT
(a) After entry of an order under Section 6, but before the surrogate
becomes pregnant through assisted conception, the court for cause, or
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the surrogate, her husband, or the intended parents may terminate the
surrogacy agreement by giving written notice of termination to all other
parties and filing notice of the termination with the court. Thereupon,
the court shall vacate the order entered under Section 6.
(b) A surrogate who has provided an egg for the assisted conception
pursuant to an agreement approved under Section 6 may terminate the
agreement by filing written notice with the court within 180 days after
the last insemination pursuant to the agreement. Upon finding, after no-
tice to the parties to the agreement and hearing, that the surrogate has
voluntarily terminated the agreement and understands the nature, mean-
ing, and effect of the termination, the court shall vacate the order entered
under Section 6.
(c) The surrogate is not liable to the intended parents for terminat-
ing the agreement pursuant to this section.
SECTION 8. PARENTAGE UNDER APPROVED SURROGACY
AGREEMENT
(a) The following rules of parentage apply to surrogacy agreements
approved under Section 6:
(1) Upon birth of a child to the surrogate, the intended par-
ents are the parents of the child and the surrogate and her hus-
band, if she is married, are not parents of the child unless the court
vacates the order pursuant to Section 7(b).
(2) If, after notice of termination by the surrogate, the court
vacates the order under Section 7(b) the surrogate is the mother of
a resulting child, and her husband, if a party to the agreement, is
the father. If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agree-
ment or the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is gov-
erned by [the Uniform Parentage Act].
(b) Upon birth of the child, the intended parents shall fie a written
notice with the court that a child has been born to the surrogate within
300 days after assisted conception. Thereupon, the court shall enter an
order directing the [Department of Vital Statistics] to issue a new birth
certificate naming the intended parents as parents and to seal the original
birth certificate in the records of the [Department of Vital Statistics].
SECTION 9. SURROGACY: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(a) A surrogacy agreement that is the basis of an order under Sec-
tion 6 may provide for the payment of consideration.
(b) A surrogacy agreement may not limit the right of the surrogate
to make decisions regarding her health care or that of the embryo or
fetus.
(c) After the entry of an order under Section 6, marriage of the sur-
rogate does not affect the validity of the order, and her husband's consent
to the surrogacy agreement is not required, nor is he the father of a re-
sulting child.
(d) A child born to a surrogate within 300 days after assisted con-
ception pursuant to an order under Section 6 is presumed to result from
the assisted conception. The presumption is conclusive as to all persons
who have notice of the birth and who do not commence within 180 days
after notice, an action to assert the contrary in which the child and the
parties to the agreement are named as parties. The action must be com-
menced in the court that issued the order under Section 6.
(e) A health-care provider is not liable for recognizing the surrogate
as the mother before receipt of a copy of the order entered under Section
6 or for recognizing the intended parents as parents after receipt of an
order entered under Section 6.]
[END OF ALTERNATIVE A]
ALTERNATIVE B
[SECTION 5. SURROGATE AGREEMENTS
An agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to
relinquish her rights and duties as parent of a child thereafter conceived
through assisted conception is void. However, she is the mother of a
resulting child, and her husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father
of the child. If her husband is not a party to the agreement or the surro-
gate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed by [the Uniform
Parentage Act].]
END OF ALTERNATIVE B]
SECTION 10. PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP; STATUS
OF CHILD
(a) A child whose status as a child is declared or negated by this
[Act] is the child only of his or her parents as determined under this
[Act].
(b) Unless superseded by later events forming or terminating a par-
ent and child relationship, the status of parent and child declared or ne-
gated by this [Act] as to a given individual and a child born alive controls
for purposes of:
(1) intestate succession;
(2) probate law exemptions, allowances, or other protections
for children in a parent's estate; and
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(3) determining eligibility of the child or its descendants to
share in a donative transfer from any person as a member of a class
determined by reference to the relationship.
SECTION 11. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act]
among states enacting it.
SECTION 12. SHORT TITLE
This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act.
SECTION 13. SEVERABILITY
If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provi-
sions or applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
[Act] are severable.
SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE
This [Act] shall take effect on . Its provisions are to
be applied prospectively.
SECTION 15. REPEALS
Acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this [Act] are repealed to the
extent of the inconsistency.
SECTION 16. APPLICATION TO EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS
This [Act] applies to surrogacy agreements entered into after its ef-
fective date.2
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